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THE NECESSITY FOR SHELTER: STATES
MUST PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CHILDREN IN HOUSING
I. Introduction
For many families, the dream of "a white picket fence" is less
likely than ever before to become a reality. The increased costs of
purchasing a home' make it extremely difficult for the majority of
homeowners to raise enough capital to realize their dream.' The
rental market is just as bleak as the buying market, because the de-
mand for apartments often exceeds the supply,3 which creates a
landlords' market and shifts increased costs to the tenant.4
The tightening of both the buying and rental markets for housing,
as well as changing societal needs' and the unequal bargaining power
1. See North, Effects of the Recession and Housing Supply on Fair Housing
Goals, in A SHELTERED CRIusis: THE STATE OF FAmu HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 70,
71 (1983) [hereinafter North]. From 1976 to 1981, the median sales price of single-
family homes increased from $38,100 to $66,400, and the average sales price increased
from $42,200 to $78,300. See id.
2. See id. at 72. Using an affordability index, a measure which equates median
family income with the qualifying income required by the National Mortgage
Association to purchase a home with a 2007o down payment, and the number 100
occurs when qualifying income equals median income, the capacity to purchase a
home declined from 120.6 in 1977 to 70.6 in 1982. See id.
3. See Hinds, How 135,000 Change Tenancies Every Year, N.Y. Times, Feb.
16, 1986, § 8, at 1, col. 2. The author states that New York City has an "unofficial
housing vacancy rate of minus 1 percent-the official vacancy rate of 2 percent
minus the 3 percent of housing that is dilapidated." Id.; see also Protests are
Mounting Over "Adults-Only" Rentals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 4, 1980,
at 58. "Vacancy rates in many cities are at a record low because of a sharp decline
in building and the conversion of many rental projects to condominiums." Id.
4. See Schechter, The Effects of the Recession and Housing Supply on Fair
Housing Goals, Public and Private, in A SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF FAIR
HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 54, 55 (1983) [hereinafter Schecter]. "As [a] result, more
of available income was being paid for housing in 1980 than in 1970. The median
gross rent for the overall populace, for example, rose from 20076 of income
to 27 percent in 1980." Id. Furthermore, families with children "often pay over
one-third of their income for housing because they are refused cheaper housing."
J. Greene & G. Blake, How Restrictive Rental Practices Affect Families with
Children 3 (1980) (prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy Development and Research) [hereinafter Greene &
Blake].
5. See Ridings, Discrimination Against Women in Housing Finance, in A
SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 104 (1983). "As
homeownership becomes less financially possible for young families and as the
number of divorced, widowed, elderly, and childless couples increases-all of which
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between landlord and tenant, have caused many landlords to convert
their buildings into "adults-only ' 6 complexes. A recent federal study
revealed that twenty-six percent of the nation's rental units banned
children entirely, and an additional fifty percent limited them by
number, age, or other factors. 7 Landlords justify their actions by
pointing to the increased maintenance and liability insurance costs
related to renting to families with children. 8
No statistics, however, support the contentions of these landlords.'
Thus, critics of "adults-only" housing argue that the driving force
behind child-exclusion practices is the demand for such housing
created by individuals who wish to isolate themselves from the
disturbances of children and are willing to pay a premium for their
have altered the demand for housing-the availability of rental housing for families
with children has turned.into a salient issue." Id. at 107.
6. For the purposes of this Note, the phrase "adults-only" complexes will
encompass apartments, cooperatives, and condominiums that restrict residency to
those over the age of eighteen.
7. See Lublin, Landlords' "No-Children" Policies Frustrate Parents Seeking
Housing, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1985, at 35, col. 3 [hereinafter Lublin]; see also
R. MARANS & M. COLTEN, MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL SURVEY 24 (1980) (prepared for the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and
Research) [hereinafter MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES].
8. See Edelman, No Children-Landlords Say-Stop It, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1983, at A23, col. 3 [hereinafter Edelman]. The author states that "[Illandlords
cite higher maintenance costs as the reason for creating no-children policies. But
there is no evidence to support this claim. The truth is that landlords may be able
to charge higher rents for all-adult complexes in a nation that is increasingly anti-
child." Id.; see also MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 63.
The authors found that "[flour in five respondents said that ... higher maintenance
costs [were] either a big problem or somewhat of a problem . . . ." Id.
On the issue of higher insurance costs, see Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent-An
Examination of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in Rental Housing,
94 HARv. L. REV. 1829, 1836 n.39 (1981) ("Fifteen percent of the apartment
owners or managers found higher insurance costs a big problem, with an additional
23% considering them somewhat a problem") (citation omitted) [hereinafter Why
Johnny Can't Rent]. See MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES, supra note 7, at
68. The survey reported that a total of 36% of managers stated that higher insurance
costs were a big problem or somewhat of a problem, whereas 64% did not find higher
insurance costs a problem at all. See id.
9. See supra note 8; see also Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,
640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). In Marina
Point, the landlord's expert witnesses testified that landlords who rent to families
with children tend to have higher maintenance costs than landlords who exclude
children, because children cause more wear and tear on the property. 30 Cal. 3d
at 728, 640 P.2d at 119, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 500. The witnesses based this statement,
however, on their general experience rather than on empirical data. Id.; cf. Why
Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 8, at 1836 n.39 (study found that insurance companies
did not "consider the presence of children a significant factor in setting rates for
apartment buildings") (citation omitted).
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seclusion.' 0 In addition, the current lack of apartment construction
suitable for family living arrangements has exacerbated this problem."
Rationales underlying child-exclusion practices include both the
landlord's right to the free alienation of his property and the
right of tenants to choose a child-free living situation. 2 Both these
goals are ordinarily sanctioned by society. Nevertheless, when the
groups most affected by these child-exclusion practices are consid-
ered, 3 the end result is an increase in the number of homeless
individuals" and families living in substandard conditions.' 5 This
10. See supra note 9; see also Golubock, Housing Discrimination Against Families
with Children: A Growing Problem of Exclusionary Practices, in A SHELTERED
CRIsIs: THE STATE oF FAIR HouSING IN THE EIGrrms 128 (1983) [hereinafter Go-
lubock]. The author reported on a 1980 United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) study that revealed that rents tended to be higher in
child-restricted buildings. See id. at 130 (citation omitted).
The 1980 HUD survey revealed that 40%o of the persons living in child-excluded
complexes had reasons for their preference not to live near children. See MEASURING
RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 57. Fifty-one percent gave noise as
the reason for their preference, and only 17%'0 of the responses had to do with
"destructiveness, property damage or pranks." Id.
11. See Lublin, supra note 7, at 35, col. 3. "The family-housing crisis . . . is
largely a symptom of . . . the widespread shortages of affordable apartments and
the increased popularity of adults-only complexes that cater to the elderly and to
young, childless adults." Id.; see also MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRAC-
TICES, supra note 7, at 44. The authors found that "[wihereas one in three
units built since 1970 are in buildings/complexes not accepting families with children,
about one in five units in places built earlier have such restrictions." Id. Furthermore,
"[e]xclusionary policies appear to be increasing over time. Whereas one in four
units in 1980 do not allow children, one in six units in buildings/complexes built
prior to 1975 excluded children at that time." Id. at 71.
In the same survey, 40o of persons living in complexes excluding children said
they chose the complex because children did not live there. See id. at 59. Furthermore,
37.3o would move out of the complex if children were permitted to live there.
See id. at 62.
12. But see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). In Marina, the court stated:
"In]either statute nor interpretation of statute, however, sanctions the sacrifice of
the well-being of children on the altar of a landlord's profit, or possibly some
tenants' convenience." Id. at 745, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511; see also
infra note 17.
13. See infra note 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the groups
most affected by these practices.
14. See Edelman, supra note 8, at A23, col. 3. "In the worst instances, families
live in cars, vans, abandoned buildings, tents and rundown motels and hotels. One
family with six children spent two and one-half months living on the Santa Monica,
Calif., pier in the family's station wagon while they searched for a home." Id.
See also Greene & Blake, supra note 4, at 33. The survey revealed that "[d]uring
the past year, 44 percent of all respondents had lived with family or friends, 19
percent had lived with family members in separate households, and 33 percent had
lived in cars, vans, abandoned buildings, or tents." Id.
15. See Edelman, supra note 8, at A23, cols. 1-2. "The H.U.D. survey revealed
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outcome bothers the consciences of many. For example Justice Mat-
thew 0. Tobriner, voicing his opinion in Marina Point, Ltd. v.
Wolfson, 6 "A society that sanctions wholesale discrimination
against its children in obtaining housing engages in suspect activity.
Even the most primitive society fosters the protection of its young;
such a society would hardly discriminate against children in their
need for shelter." ' 17
Although there is a real need to eradicate this form of discrim-
ination, state legislatures have been unable to find a practical solution
for the problem. The strong lobbying power of real estate developers
and landlords often defeats any legislative attempts at reform.' 8 Fur-
thermore, the few states that have passed legislation dealing with this
problem have failed to provide an effective scheme for enforcing these
rights.' Finally, courts cannot find the legal-support, in the absence
of statutory authority, to strike down these practices."0
stories about rats and severe cockroach infestations .... Many parents said they
believed their apartments were not repaired because the owners knew that the
families had no place else to go. More than eight million children in the United
States are now living in inadequate housing." Id.; see also Golubock, supra note
10 at 129; cf. Greene & Blake, supra note 4, at 16. The survey revealed that
"[florty-seven percent of the sample said they lived in substandard housing in the
past year with 35.6 percent currently living in substandard housing . . . ." Id.
16. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
858 (1982).
17. Id. at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511; see Schmidt v. Superior
Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). In Schmidt, the court stated:
We can certainly understand the motivation of some adults to seek the
peace and quiet of a setting that is free from the rough and tumble
commotion of exuberant youth. However, the right of an adult to enjoy
such relative tranquillity] is decidedly outweighed by society's vital and
compelling interest in providing housing which fosters wholesome de-
velopment of its children."
215 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
18. See Lublin, supra note 7, at 35, col. 4. For instance, Rhode Island's bill
was "stalled for five years in the state Senate ... and passed only after developers
were granted an exemption for adults-only housing." Id. Similar exemptions are
found in the statutes of Arizona, Alaska, Maine and Virginia. See infra notes 206-
09 and accompanying text. Similarly, a proposed amendment to the Fair Housing
Act has met opposition from the National Realtors Association over the inclusion
of. families as a protected class. See infra notes 24, 184 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 217-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
with the current statutory schemes.
20. See Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr.
644 (1971) (plaintiffs failed to assert violation of Unruh Act because discrimination
against families not based on color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin);
Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946) (upholding
landlord's discrimination against children because state had not declared such
practices against public policy); see also Department of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp.,
421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984) (restricting families with children is not per se
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Recognizing the need for federal legislation to curtail child
discrimination in housing, in 1983, several members of Congress in-
troduced a bill to amend the Fair Housing Act (the Act).2" The bill,
which would include families with children as a protected class under
the Act,22 was not enacted during the 98th Congressional Session,
and Senator Mathias reintroduced the bill for congressional considera-
tion in February, 1986 and February, 1987.23 The bill has not yet
had a full hearing, and is currently pending in the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee.2"
After surveying the different paths courts and legislatures have
taken in their attempts to end this discriminatory practice, this Note
concludes that the most feasible and appropriate solution to the
problem is a more effective form of state legislation.2" Part II discusses
the likelihood of success and the issues surrounding a claim based
upon a denial of fourteenth amendment rights.26 Part III centers on
the possibility of using the Fair Housing Act for a private cause
of action and the problems with the proposed bill to amend the
Act.27 Part IV examines the state statutes that attempt to ban this
form of discrimination and the reasons for their ineffectiveness.28
Finally, because of the inadequacy of each of these other courses
of action, this Note advocates amending existing state statutes to
provide for both a private cause of action and the establishment of
housing commissions." In either case, the statute should empower
violation of Civil Rights Act since Act does not require identical treatment of
children and adults in every situation).
21. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, §§ 801-831, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982),
provides, in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be unlawful-(a) [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (b) [t]o discriminate
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilites in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...
Id. § 3604.
22. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6152 (1983).
23. See S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 132 CONG. REC. 848 (1986); S. 558,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2256 (1987).
24. Telephone interview with staff member of the House Judiciary Committee.
(Mar. 14, 1986).
25. See infra notes 217-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
with the present statutes and proposals to make them more effective.
26. See infra notes 33-134 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 135-201 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 202-97 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 235-64 and accompanying text.
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the court or administrative agency: (1) to use the doctrine of a
prima facie case similar to that used in claims brought under the
Fair Housing Act;30 (2) to create a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination whenever a landlord refuses to rent to individuals
with children, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to the
landlord;3 and (3) in order to encourage private enforcement of
these statutory rights, to provide economic incentives to the parties
injured by this discrimination, e.g., a civil penalty and attorney's
fees.32
I. A Fourteenth Amendment Cause of Action
In Halet v. Wend Investment Co.,33 the Ninth Circuit faced the
issue of whether it should strike down child-exclusion practices as
a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.3" After plaintiff Halet's application for an
apartment in defendant Wend's complex was denied because of an
adults-only rental policy,35 Halet sued Wend claiming a denial of his
fourteenth amendment rights.3 Specifically, Halet contended that the
policy infringed on his right under the due process clause to raise
a family and discriminated against families with children in violation
of the equal protection clause." The Ninth Circuit held that the district
court had improperly analyzed the landlord's practice under a rational
basis test, the minimum standard of review applied to a fourteenth
amendment challenge.3" The appellate court stated that the highest
standard of review was necessary; "Strict scrutiny is required . . .
when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
30. See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 273-83 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 284-97 and accompanying text.
33. 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides in pertinent part: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." See infra note 39 for a discussion of judicial review of fourteenth amendment
challenges.
35. See Halet, 672 F.2d at 1307.
36. See id. at 1307.
37. See id. at 1309.
38. See id. at 1310. The district court had dismissed the complaint stating that
because children were not a "[discrete and] insular minority" the policy passed
the lesser degree of judicial scrutiny required in equal protection claims when a
suspect class was not involved. Id.
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suspect class." 3 9 Based on Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"' in which
the Supreme Court had held that the right of family members to live
together is part of the fundamental right of privacy, 41 the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case for the district court's con-
sideration of whether a " 'genuinely significant' deprivation of a
fundamental right [had] occurred. ' 42
If adopted by other jurisdictions, the Halet holding would provide
a significant weapon for parties injured by a landlord's discrimination
against children.43 Other holdings of the Supreme Court,44 however,
as well as the decisions of several federal 45 and state4 6 courts, indicate
that, because of two requirements to a fourteenth amendment cause
of action, the chance the courts would declare these practices un-
constitutional is minimal at best.
A. The State Action Requirement
To claim that a private person has denied one his rights secured by
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, one must allege some
form of state involvement in the private activity. The next two
subsections set forth the theories upon which courts have found that
a private party's actions would be deemed "state action" for the pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment.
39. Id. Generally, economic or social welfare legislation, or state actions, which
differentiate between individuals, will be upheld by a court as long as they are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See generally J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535-734 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. However, if a law or action by the state works to the
disadvantage of a member of a "suspect class," a court will require the state to
assert a "compelling" governmental interest that is necessarily advanced by the
legislation, or action. See id. at 591-92. The classifications that the Supreme Court
has deemed to be suspect include race, alienage, national origin, and gender. See
id. at 611-713. See infra note 109 for a discussion of the level of judicial scrutiny
applied to gender-based classifications.
40. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
41. Id. at 498-99. In fourteenth amendment actions, "the 'right to privacy' has
come to mean the right to engage in certain highly personal activities." CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 735. See infra notes 90-92 for cases involving
the right to privacy under the fourteenth amendment.
42. Halet, 672 F.2d at 1311.
43. See Granelli, "Adults Only" Housing Suffers Judicial Setbacks, Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 1, 1982, at 5, col. 2 (stating that "the [Ninth] Circuit case [is] potentially
more important .... [since] the federal case could become law across the nation").
44. See infra notes 52-53, 83, 89, 91, 100-01, 106-07, 112-14 and accompanying
text.
45. See infra notes 60-62, 80, 91, 96-105, 108, 111, 127-34 and accompanying
text.
46. See infra notes 52, 63-72, 91-95, 117-26 and accompanying text.
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1. The Shelley Doctrine
Typically, plaintiffs who claim to be the victims of discrimination
at the hands of landlords' child-exclusion practices, and who seek relief
under the fourteenth amendment, base their right to sue on section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code."7 To maintain an
action under this statute, the plaintiff must show that the defend-
ant deprived him of a right secured by "the constitution and the
laws ' 48 of the United States and that the defendant effected this
deprivation "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom or usage, of any state or territory." ' 49 Thus, a necessary element
of any claim brought under this statute is the presence of state
involvement in the alleged deprivation. 0 As stated in Halet, "[tihe
under-color-of-state-law requirement of section 1983 is equivalent to
the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment."'"
Because of the purely private nature of a lease agreement, it is
difficult to find state action in the landlord-tenant relationship.12
Consequently, constitutional scrutiny of a landlord's refusal to rent
47. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The Act provides
that in a civil action alleging a deprivation of rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.; see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
48. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
49. See id.
50. Halet, 672 F.2d at 1309.
51. Id. at 1309-10 (citing Arnold v. IBM Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
52. See Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children: The Legal Status of
a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAm. L. 559, 579 (1977) (contending that
"[dliscrimination by a landlord in the private sector appears to be beyond the
scope of the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court") (citing
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)); see also Lamont Bldg. Co.
v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946). Lamont involved an eviction
by a landlord because of the tenants' alleged violation of a condition in the lease
prohibiting occupancy by children. See id. at 183, 70 N.E.2d at 447. In upholding
the eviction, the court stated:
"Competent persons ordinarily have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and their agreements voluntarily and fairly made will be held valid and
enforced in the courts. Parties may incorporate in their agreements any
provisions that are not illegal or violative of public policy." . . . Ordinarily,
the owner of real property may surround its occupation and use by
others with such reasonable restrictions as he may deem fit and proper.
Id. at 184-85, 70 N.E.2d at 448 (citation omitted).
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to individuals with children is frequently unavailable-"the [four-
teenth] [a]mendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful."53
One commentator has enumerated the various ways a landlord can
discriminate against children: "[A]n initial refusal to rent to families
with children, a refusal to renew a lease . . . because of the presence
of children, and a covenant in a lease permitting the landlords
terminate the lease if children later occupy the premises." 5 4 In the
absence of any substantial state involvement with the landlord, any
finding of state action in these circumstances would be tenuous at
best." Although there is a doctrine- known as the "Shelley doc-
trine," after the case of Shelley v. Kraemer56-that allows courts to
find state action based on a landlord's use of a state's judicial
machinery to enforce a private agreement, the courts have refused
to extend this doctrine beyond cases involving the enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants. 7
It is true that a literal reading of Shelley's language-"but for
the active intervention of the state courts, . . . petitioners would
have been free to occupy the properties in question without re-
straint," 58-would, as one commentator has noted, "subject any
private agreement enforceable by a court to constitutional review." 9
Nevertherless, courts have consistently limited the Shelley doctrine
because of their fear that its unfettered use would serve as a vehicle
for constitutional review of all private actions, whenever a defendant
utilizes the state's judicial machinery. 6w
53. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, a white woman claimed a denial of equal
protection when she was refused service in a cafeteria because she was accompanied
by blacks. See id. at 147. The Supreme Court stated: "On the other hand, § I
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a private party, not acting against
a backdrop of state compulsion or involvement, to discriminate on the basis of
race in his personal affairs as an expression of his own personal predilections."
Id. at 169.
54. Travalio, Suffer the Little Children-But Not in My Neighborhood: A
Constitutional View of Age-Restrictive Housing, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 295, 335 (1979).
55. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type
of state involvement needed to find state action.
56. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
57. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
58. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
59. Stanley, Age Restrictions in Housing: The Denial of the Family's Right to
its Integrity, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 61, 80-81 (1984) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Stanley].
60. Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120-21 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 532
F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1976). In Fallis, the court stated that:
A second reason for limiting the Shelley v. Kraemer rule is the danger
which the use of that doctrine poses as a precedent. A logical extension
1987]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
Courts applying the Shelley doctrine to cases involving discrimi-
nation against children in housing have disagreed on how to apply
it. For example, in the rental context, the court in Langley v.
Monumental Corp.61 refused to apply the Shelley doctrine to a
landlord's eviction proceeding, stating that:
The mere use of a state's eviction procedures does not constitute
"state action," at least where there has been no showing of other
significant state involvement in the private conduct, when the
challenged discrimination is not racial in nature, or when the
courts are not thereby enforcing a covenant which is discriminatory
on its face. 62
By contrast, in the sale context, some courts have held that
Shelley's doctrine will apply. For example, in Franklin v. White
of the doctrine would result in a federal cause of action existing whenever
any state police power is used by private persons where constitutionally
protected rights are involved . . . . Such an extension has so great an
application to purely private action as to be overbroad.
386 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
All but one federal court considering this question has held that a tenant cannot
successfully argue that a landlord's use of the state judicial system to effectuate
an eviction constituted state action. See, e.g., Zephier v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 856 (8th
Cir. 1983); Deal v. Newport Datsun, Ltd., 706 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1983); Higbee
v. Starr, 698 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Hartwood Apts., Ltd., 689 F.2d
1239 (5th Cir. 1982); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Weigland v.
Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Patel, 564 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Va. 1983); Chicarelli v.
Plymouth Garden Apts., 551 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Walton v. Darby
Town Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hohensee v. Dailey, 383
F. Supp. 6 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va.
1973); Caramico v. Romney, 390 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974); Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("[tlhere is no doubt today that judicial action in private disputes
is a form of state action required for application of the [fourteenth] amendment").
61. 496 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Md. 1980). Monumental had registered its building
with the local housing commission as restricted to adults-only. See id. at 1146.
After the Langleys' lease expired, Monumental refused to renew their lease because
the Langleys were allegedly violating the adults-only restriction. See id. Monumental
had threatened to bring a holdover proceeding in state court when the Langleys
refused to vacate the premises. See id. at 1150-51.
62. Id. at 1151. The court was wary of applying the Shelley doctrine to this
situation because it could "convert much purely private action into 'state action'
.... " Id. (citing Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973);
Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973); Lavoie v. Bigwood
457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972); McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117
(N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1976); Mullarkey v. Borglum,
323 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
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Egret Condominium, Inc. ,63 the plaintiffs asked the court to compel
the reconveyance of a condominium because the defendants had
breached the condominium rules provision included in their contract of
sale that prohibited occupancy by children under the age of twelve. 6"
The court recognized that voluntary adherence to these agreements
would fail to implicate state action. 6 Nevertheless, the court found
state action on the ground that, in ordering reconveyance, the court
would necessarily legitimize the restrictive covenant. 6 On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court failed to address the issue of the lower
court's use of the Shelley doctrine. The appellate court's opinion,
however, contains evidence of that court's acceptance of the use of
the Shelley doctrine. The court stated that "[w]henever an age
restriction is attacked on due process or equal protection grounds,
we find the test is: (1) whether the restriction under the particular
circumstances of the case is reasonable, and (2) whether it is dis-
criminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive in its application. '67 The mere
mention of a due process or equal protection analysis indicates that
the Florida Supreme Court found the requisite state action in this
case. Other jurisdictions have followed this test. 68
63. 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 379
So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
64. See 358 So. 2d at 1086.
65. See id. at 1088.
66. See id. at 1089.
67. White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351 (Fla.
1979). See Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Servs., Inc.,
408 So. 2d 711, 719-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court explained finding of state
action in White Egret by stating that "the use of the power of the judiciary to
compel or legitimize private actions is really state encouragement of forbidden
discrimination") (emphasis in original).
68. See Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 334 S.E.2d 690, 691 (Ga.
1985) ("age restrictions as to occupancy of condominiums are not unreasonable");
Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985) (condominium by-law which prohibited children if they moved in
during first seven months of ownership held "reasonable means of achieving the
legitimate goals of maintaining a virtually child free environment without undue hard-
ships to present owners and residents"). But see Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n,
Inc. v. Chambliss, 705 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). In Chambliss although
the court used the White Egret test, it did not find the requisite state action, and
thus, disagreed with the plaintiff's contention of Moore's applicability. See id.
In California, there is some authority for the finding of state action through
the judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant. See Park Redlands Covenant
Control Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1986). In
Simon, although the court mentioned the possibility of finding state action through
the court's enforcement of the covenant restricting occupancy by children, the court
based state action on the state's encouragement of the violation of rights. See
226 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (citations omitted). The encouragement by the state was
1987]
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Even in the sale context, however, some courts have refused to
apply the Shelley doctrine. For example, the court in Riley v. Stoves69
refused to apply the doctrine, stating that when the state had no
hand in drafting the restriction, a court should not use a rational
relationship test.70
The contrary results reached in Franklin and Riley are surprising
when one considers their factual similarity to Shelley.7 In these
cases, the sale between a willing buyer and a willing seller would
have occurred but for the request of a third party (usually an
adjoining homeowner) for judicial intervention. 72 In the rental con-
text, however, the court would not interfere with the dealings of
two willing parties.73 This factual difference between the sale and
rental contexts could explain the lack of cases applying the Shelley
doctrine to a court's enforcement of a restrictive lease provision.
74
2. Other Theories for State Action
The state action requirement of section 1983 has been satisfied
on the basis of three other theories espoused by the Supreme Court.
Under these theories courts may consider a private party to be
engaging in state action when: (1) the private party serves a public
an agreement between the developer and the city that in return for a special use
permit, the developer would limit occupancy by the age and number of occupants.
See id.
69. See 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
70. Id. at 228, 526 P.2d at 752.
71. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the Supreme Court
held that a lower court's enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constituted
state action. See id. at 20. The facts are similar to these cases: in Shelley, the
seller was willing to sell his home to a black family and it was the adjoining
landowners who sought the court's enforcement of the racially restrictive deed
covenant. See id. at 6. In these cases, the adjoining condominium owners brought
suit to enjoin the sale to families with children. See Franklin v. White Egret
Condominium Ass'n, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979); Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,
255 Ga. 24, 334 S.E.2d 690 (1985); Preston Tower Condominium Ass'n v. S.B.
Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). But see Riley v. Stoves, 22
Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (court refused to apply Shelley doctrine).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. In the rental situation, it is a landlord's refusal to rent, or a restrictive
lease provision, that prevents the family from living in the apartment.
74. See supra notes 60-62. But see Stanley, supra note 59, at 80-81, in which
he argues that restrictive covenants are a powerful tool and may have the same
effect as zoning an area childless. See id. In addition, Stanley argues that "if
society is to maintain effective control on private land use restrictions, that control
must come from the courts in the form of judicial review." Id. at 82.
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function; 75 (2) the state commands or encourages the private activity; 6
or (3) the state and the private party have enough mutual contacts
that the state may be deemed to be a "joint participant" in the ac-
tivity. 7
7
The state action requirement in Halet was predicated on this "joint
participant" theory.78 Several of the factors the court deemed relevant
to this theory were that: (1) Los Angeles County had owned the land
and leased it to defendant Wend; (2) federal and state funds had been
used to develop the land; (3) the County had had final approval on
the design plans; (4) the County had controlled the use and purpose
of the apartment, as well as the rent charged; and (5) Wend had given
the County a percentage of the rent charged."9 Other courts have
deemed the state to be a joint participant with the landlord when:
(1) the latter received financial benefits from the government and was
subject to substantial state regulation;80 and (2) an urban renewal
75. Courts will employ the public function theory when the state entrusts a
private individual with the performance of functions that are governmental in
nature. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (operation of private park in
racially discriminatory manner violated fourteenth amendment under public function
theory); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (racially restrictive pre-primary
elections violated fifteenth amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(privately owned town's refusal to allow Jehovah's Witness to distribute literature
on sidewalk violated first amendment rights, because town served a public function);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (democratic convention establishing rule
that only whites could vote in primary held to violate fifteenth amendment). But
see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (sale by warehouseman of
goods stored with him and in which he had a warehouseman's lien held not serving
public function); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (operation
of privately owned utility licensed and regulated by state held not serving public
function).
76. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state action found when
California voters by referendum amended state constitution to prohibit state gov-
ernment from interfering with any private individual's right to discriminate in real
estate transactions).
77. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (operation
of restaurant in racially discriminatory manner violated fourteenth amendment
utilizing joint participant theory).
78. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. See id. The other factors the court deemed relevant were: (1) that the purchase
of the land was part of a large redevelopment plan; (2) that the land was leased
to Wend for public housing; (3) that the lease prohibited racial or religious dis-
crimination; and (4) that Wend had to abide by all of the conditions enumerated
in the lease. See id.
80. See Barnett, Child Exclusion Policies in Housing, 67 Ky. L.J. 967, 976
n.45 (1978) (citing Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors,
504 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir.
1973); Fenner v. Bruce Manor, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (D. Md. 1976); Owens
v. Housing Auth., 394 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (D. Conn. 1975); Dew v. McLendon
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agency obtained land through its use of an eminent domain proceeding.8'
B. The Requirement of a Deprivation of a Fundamental Right
Thus, if a plaintiff could assert sufficient state involvement in
the alleged discrimination, the second element of a section 1983
action, i.e., the "under color of state law" element, would be satisfied.
Plaintiffs bringing a section 1983 action, however, face an even greater
difficulty in showing a deprivation of a right secured by the Con-
stitution, the first element of a section 1983 action. The following
sections discuss the likelihood of a court's finding that a landlord's
child-exclusion practices violate a family's constitutional rights.
1. Moore and the Fundamental Right of Family Living
Arrangements in Apartments
The first element of a section 1983 action is that the plaintiff
must show the defendant denied him his constitutional rights.12 This
requirement would be satisfied if a court found that the right to
live together as a family in an apartment is a fundamental right
under the Constitution. 3 If it made such a finding, the court would
Gardens Ass'n, 394 F. Supp. 1223, 1230 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Bloodworth v. Oxford
Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709, 716-17 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Anderson v.
Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (W.D. Va. 1973). Contra Rodriguez v. Towers Apts.,
Inc., 416 F. Supp. 304 (D.P.R. 1976) [hereinafter Child Exclusion]. See also Swann
v. Gastonia Housing Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1343 (4th Cir. 1982) (eviction of tenant
from housing subsidized by state in accordance with § 8 of United States Housing
Act of 1937 was under color of state law for purposes of § 1983). But see Zephier
v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 856, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1983) (no state action when § 8 landlord
evicts tenant) (dicta); Miller v. Hartwood Apts., Ltd., 689 F.2d 1239, 1243-44 (5th
Cir. 1982) (eviction of tenant from § 8 housing project held devoid of state action).
81. See Child Exclusion, supra note 80, at 976 n.46 (citing Lopez v. Henry
Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1974); Male v. Crossroads
Assocs., 469 F.2d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781
(1st Cir. 1971); Short v. Fulton Redev. Co., 390 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968));
see also McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1972)
(land acquired through eminent domain pursuant to urban renewal plan was sufficient
governmental involvement to find state action; landlord's actions were subject
to fourteenth amendment).
82. See supra notes 47-48.
83. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, the Supreme
Court held that a city's zoning restriction had unconstitutionally interfered with
family living arrangements. See id. at 499-500, 506. Courts consistently distinguish
Moore from cases involving apartments or condominiums, and hold that there was
no unconstitutional infringement because age is not a suspect class, and housing
is not a fundamental right. See infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text for a
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then require the state to assert that the discriminatory practice necessar-
ily serves a compelling governmental interest.84
A court, however, would be unlikely to hold that a landlord's
child-exclusion practices interfered with a fundamental right. Only
two courts have held that a state had impermissibly interfered with
a fundamental right when it attempted to exclude children from
housing.85 First, in Halet v. Wend Investment Co., the Ninth
Circuit held that the right of family members to live together is
part of the fundamental right of privacy.16 The court decided that
the intrusion into the familial right of privacy on the facts of this
case was even greater than that presented in Moore.8 7 The court
found this intrusion to be greater because the adults-only restriction
in question prohibited parents from living with their children, while
the zoning ordinance in Moore had merely prohibited a grandmother
from living with her grandchildren.18
Second, in Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., the Florida
District Court of Appeal found that all the pertinent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court89 concerning the family added up to
discussion of these holdings. Therefore, in order for a court to find an uncon-
stitutional infringement upon a fundamental right, the right to live together as a
family in an apartment must be held to be a fundamental right.
84. The exact level of judicial scrutiny in Moore was somewhat vague: "when
the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." Moore, 431
U.S. at 499. In contrast, the traditional strict scrutiny applied whenever a state
by its actions infringes upon a fundamental right is "that the law be necessary to
promote a compelling or overriding interest of government." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 39, at 418-19..
85. See Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982); Franklin v.
White Egret Condominium Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd
on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979); see also Park Redlands Covenant
Control Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1986) (covenant
restricting residency to three persons aged 45 and older violated constitutional right
to privacy under California state constitution).
86. Halet, 672 F.2d at 1311 (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99).
87. See id. at 1311.
88. See id.; see Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
89. The court cited the following Supreme Court decisions as providing the
constitutional basis for declaring a child-exclusion practice unconstitutional because
of the recognized right of privacy regarding family decisions: Moore, 431 U.S. at
521 (zoning statute regulating family living arrangements violated fourteenth amend-
ment); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (statute prohibiting illegitimate children
from inheriting by intestate succession from father but allowing legitimated children
to inherit violated equal protection clause); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
(statute requiring doctors and pharmacists to send lists of persons using narcotics held
constitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (statute prohibiting abortion violated
constitutional right of privacy in decisions involving right to beget children); Stanley
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a "right of privacy [that] grants to the family protection from
unreasonable restrictions on the use of a residence." 9 The court held
that the decision to have children is protected under the fundamental
right of privacy, and stated that "[tihe fear of being compelled by
the courts of this state through the operation of this covenant to sell
or relocate a family domicile merely because a couple may choose
to have children is a burden which neither the Constitution nor this
court will condone." 9'
The weight of authority, however, is against the application of
Moore to this situation. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
the appellate court's application of Moore to Franklin. The supreme
court stated that "age limitations ... are reasonable means to
accomplish the lawful purpose of providing appropriate facilities...
[for] varying age groups. We reject the view that Moore v. City of
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statute that denied unwed fathers hearing concerning
fitness as parent but did not deny unwed mothers or divorced parents such
hearing prior to child becoming charge of state violated due process and equal
protection clauses); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (statute creating
durational residency requirements before resident had right to vote unconstitution-
ally burdened right to travel and violated equal protection); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement to obtain welfare
benefits violated equal protection clause because plaintiffs were exercising con-
stitutional right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute prohibiting
interracial marriage held unconstitutional intrusion upon fundamental right to marry);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (conspiracy to deprive blacks of certain
constitutional rights guaranteed by fourteenth amendment and right to interstate
travel held within province of federal criminal conspiracy act); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting married couples from using
contraceptives held unconstitutional intrusion upon right of privacy); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute prohibiting children from distributing
literature in public places held not to violate first amendment nor equal protection
clause); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute requiring parents
to send children to public schools held unconstitutional violation of fourteenth
amendment liberty to raise children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(statute prohibiting teaching of foreign language to children violated right of parents
to engage such instruction guaranteed by fourteenth amendment). See Franklin,
358 So. 2d at 1089 nn.4-6.
90. Franklin, 358 So. 2d at 1089.
91. Id. The court relied upon the following Supreme Court cases to support
its holding that the Constitution protects the choice to have children, and thus,
the covenant unreasonably restrained this choice: Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute prohibiting pharmacists from selling contraceptives to
those under age 16 held unconstitutional); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave violated fundamental right to bear
children guaranteed by fourteenth amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (statute prohibiting unmarried persons from using contraceptives violated
equal protection). See id. at 1089 n.8.
But see Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court Comm., 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447
(1946). In this case, the court rejected such an argument: "[P]laintiff did not say
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East Cleveland absolutely prohibits this type of limitation. ,92 Florida
courts have followed the Florida Supreme Court's holding in five
cases involving condominium restrictions93 and in a case involving
to the defendant, 'You cannot have children'; it said, merely, 'If you do have
children, they may not occupy my premises.' " Id. at 185, 70 N.E.2d at 448. See
also Child Exclusion, supra note 80, at 980-81. In this article, the author drew an
analogy between a covenant which prevented the presence of children in a con-
dominium, and a denial of welfare benefits to a pregnant woman. See id. In
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court held that a state regulation
imposing a maximum grant of financial assistance for a family's size and needs
did not violate the equal protection clause. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
Thereafter, other federal courts have held that the denial of welfare benefits to women
pregnant with their first child did not violate their fundamental right to bear children.
See Alcala v. Burns, 545 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v.
Burns, 431 U.S. 920 (1977); Taylor v. Hill, 420 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.C. 1976),
aff'd, 430 U.S. 961 (1977); Murrow v. Clifford, 404 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1975).
Thus, the author stated that the "[lack of access to necessary or desired finances
and [the] lack of access to necessary or desired housing are equally distant from
the constitutionally-protected activity of procreation ... [and) the compelling govern-
mental interest test is inappropriate." Child Exclusion, supra note 80, at 981.
This rationale, however, was not the only constitutional basis for the holding
in Franklin. For instance, the Court also found that the restrictive covenant infringed
on "free and open travel among the states," Franklin, 358 So. 2d at 1089 (citing
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)), "the interest which parents
have in being able to supervise their children's education," id. at 1089 (citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)), "and enjoy their companionship," id. at 1089-90 (citing Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)), and "the
interest concerning family living arrangements." Id. at 1089-90 (citing Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). Therefore, the Court found that the
covenant had to be supported by a "countervailing and superior interest." Franklin,
358 So. 2d at 1090. (footnote omitted).
92. White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351 (Fla.
1979). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the age
restriction could not be enforced against the plaintiffs because the age restriction
was selectively and arbitrarily applied. See id. at 352.
93. See Constellation Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378, 382
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (court upheld injunction prohibiting family from residing
together because doing so violated condominium rules that excluded children
under age 12 as permanent residents because rule was not selectively or arbitrarily
applied); Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Buckner, 462 So. 2d 835,
837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding condominium's amendment to its dec-
laration that excluded children under age 16 from residing on premises); De Sla-
topolsky v. Balmoral Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 427 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (court upheld as unambiguous provision in condominium declaration
which prohibited children under age 14); Star Lake North Commodore Ass'n, Inc.
v. Parker, 423 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court held insufficient
plaintiffs' argument that they mistakenly believed that they were unable to have
children when they began living in condominium, and therefore, plaintiffs did not
intentionally violate condominium rules); Pacheco v. Lincoln Palace Condominium,
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a deed restriction. 94 Two other jurisdictions that lacked sufficient
case law have applied this holding. 95 These holdings, and the lack
of other cases involving this issue, diminish the likelihood that other
state courts would find a violation of a constitutional right in
landlords' child-exclusion practices.
The treatment of this discrimination in federal courts further
diminishes the importance of the holdings in Halet and Franklin.
In Bynes v. Toll,96 a pre-Moore case, students argued that denying
on-campus housing to families with children constituted a denial of
equal protection, a compulsory waiver of the parents' right of marital
privacy, and the right to raise their children as they chose. 97 The
Second Circuit held that the University was not interfering with the
marital privacy of the plaintiffs or the right to bring up their children,
because they were free to procreate and educate their offspring. 98
The court stated that the relevant issue was whether the University
was constitutionally required to provide the students with housing
so that they could perform their protected prerogatives.9
The court then agreed with the lower court's application of the
rational basis test' 0 and rejected the notion that the University's
Inc., 410 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court upheld condominium's
decision to refuse application because of restrictive covenant in condominium bylaws
prohibiting children under age 12). But see Pearlman v. Lake Dora Villas Man-
agement, Inc., 479 So. 2d 780, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (condominium
declaration provision which prohibited residency by children under age 16 but
exempted children from transferees of institutional first mortgage violated equal
protection as arbitrary and discriminatory); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners
Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983) (condominium's
attempt to bar children under age 18 from residing on premises held an unreasonable
restriction, and therefore, violated California's Unruh Act, prohibiting business
establishments from engaging in arbitrary discrimination).
94. See Pomerantz v. Woodlands Section 8 Ass'n, Inc., No. 85-163, slip. op.
at 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
95. See Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass'n, Inc.; 334 S.E.2d 690, 691
(Ga. 1985) (court upheld amendment passed subsequent to plaintiff's purchase
of condominium restricting permanent residence to persons aged 16 or older, because
restriction was not so unreasonable as to be " 'repugnant to the estate granted' ");
Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Chambliss, 705 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985) (age restrictive covenant in deed to condominium held not unrea-
sonable nor applied in an arbitrary way); Preston Towers Condominium Ass'n v.
S.B. Realty, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (exception in by-laws
to no-children policy applied to: (1) persons under age of sixteen who were residents
at time declaration was filed; and (2) children born of owners at time owners were
residents of project in excess of seven months, held not unreasonable).
96. 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975).
97. See id. at 253.
98. See id, at 255.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 254. The court cited Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974) for the rational relationship standard of review. In Belle Terre, the United
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policy interfered with the plaintiffs' constitutional right to live to-
gether in marriage. 01 In the court's view, because the plaintiffs had
not asserted that the policy had an unequal impact on a "suspect
class," and because the right to housing does not involve a fun-
damental interest, the compelling interest test was inappropriate. 0 2
Similarly, in Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc.,103 the plain-
tiffs, relying on Moore, claimed that the defendant's policy of renting
only one-bedroom apartments to a parent and child of the same
sex, while permitting the rental of two-bedroom apartments to a
parent and child of the opposite sex, infringed on their right of
privacy and impermissibly regulated their family living arrangements
without due process.104 The court held that the "defendant's policy
* . .neither forbids a family from living together nor unduly interferes
with their choice of living arrangements .. . [and therefore] is not
violative of plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment rights."'0 5
Thus, the use of Moore in child discrimination cases is premature
until the Supreme Court decides that the right to housing of one's
choice is a fundamental right,'06 or that age classifications are based
States Supreme Court reviewed a zoning ordinance which restricted the number of
unrelated persons who could live together in one home. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S.
1, 2 (1974). The Court upheld the ordinance and stated that it did not violate the
equal protection clause. See id. at 8. The standard of review applied was the rational
relationship test: if the law is " 'reasonable, not arbitrary' and bears 'a rational
relationship to a [permissible] state objective.' " Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
101. See Bynes, 512 F.2d at 255. The court supported its decision by citing cases
in which resident aliens claimed that the deportation of their spouses abrogated
their constitutional right to live together in marriage. See id. at 255. This claim
was rejected in Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975); Silverman v.
Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Swartz
v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 928 (1958).
102. Id. at 255 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
103. 476 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
104. See id. at 1323.
105. Id. at 1331.
106. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (rejecting proposition that right
to housing is fundamental right). Lindsey involved an attempt to have an eviction
statute declared unconstitutional because of alleged violations of the due process and
equal protection clauses. See id. at 63-64. The appellants argued that " 'the need
for decent shelter' and the 'right to retain peaceful possession of one's home' " were
fundamental interests that could be impinged upon only after the state demonstrated
some superior interest. Id. at 73. In response, the Court stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality,
or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property
of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the payment of
rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement.
Id. at 74 (emphasis added). See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text for cases
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on suspect criteria. 10 7 Courts tend to look at the age restrictions
literally and to decide that landlords' policies of excluding persons
under the age of eighteen do not directly forbid a family from living
together. 08
Construed broadly, Moore holds that courts must scrutinize any
state interference with the choices concerning family living arrange-
ments for a finding of an important governmental interest that is
substantially advanced by the regulation.' °0 Certain decisions by land-
lords to exclude children, however, would arguably meet the "im-
portant governmental interest" standard in the following cases: (1)
cases in which a housing development is specifically designed for
the elderly; 10 (2) cases in which the premises are unsafe for children;"'
lessening the applicability of Moore to child discrimination cases.
107. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that for equal protection analysis
age should be considered a suspect class. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (state law that forced state police officers to retire at
age 50 did not violate equal protection clause). See supra notes 92-105 and accompany-
ing text for cases lessening the applicability of Moore to child discrimination cases.
108. See Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946);
see also Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1975) (court stated "[t]he
University here is not interfering with the marital privacy of the plaintiffs or their
unquestioned natural right to bring up their children. They are totally free to
procreate and educate their offspring"). But see Stanley, supra note 59, at 64,
104-08 (arguing that family unit should be given status of quasi-legal entity,
because courts fail to understand that exclusion of young children necessarily burdens
families).
109. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. The Court seemed to apply an intermediate
level of judicial scrutiny that is typically applied to statutes that create gender-
based classifications. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980) (court held unconstitutional statute which granted widows workers' compensa-
tion benefits, but only granted widowers such benefits if they proved to be financially
dependent upon their wives). In Wengler, the Supreme Court stated that to be
constitutionally permissible, "gender-based discriminations must serve important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 150.
110. See infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
111. See Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975). In Bynes, the court upheld
the restriction primarily because of the dangers that the facilities would pose for
children. See id. at 258. The University argued that the inadequate cooking facilities
posed a fire hazard, and the lack of an emergency exit from the apartment constituted
a danger to children. See id. at 256. To these contentions the court responded:
The fire hazard here alone would ... provide a rational basis for the
University position . . . the fact that adults in the past have escaped
injury is hardly predictive that infant children will possess sufficient
physical coordination and mental acuity to avoid injury, particularly in
housing with insufficient means of egress ... it is rational for the
University, which will be legally responsible for its negligence, to postpone
the residence of children until such time, if ever, that it can provide the
housing it (and not the parents) deems adequate.
Id. at 258. But see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 715,
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or (3) cases in which the lifestyle of the community would be
detrimental to the health, safety, and general welfare of the children.' 2
Construed narrowly, Moore holds only that a city may not use'
its zoning power to exclude the right of an extended family from
living together within its boundaries, ' 3 because of an irrational fear
of increased density, traffic, and extra burdens on the school sys-
tem."" Using this holding, courts have granted exemptions in the
areas of zoning for the elderly" 5 and mobile home parks designed
for the elderly." 6 In these cases, courts have used the rational basis
test rather than the stricter scrutiny Moore would require.
2. Moore's Impact on Land-Use for the Elderly
In cases involving challenges to zoning ordinances that restrict
land use for the benefit of the elderly," 7 state courts have emphasized
180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). In Marina Point, the court
did not accept the landlord's argument that the premises presented a danger to
children, thereby making the landlord's decision to exclude children reasonable.
See id. at 744 n.13, 640 P.2d at 129 n.13, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510 n.13.
112. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 437 U.S. 50 (1976) (separate
zoning of adult movie theatres upheld against first amendment challenge as valid
line drawn to preserve character of neighborhoods); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (upheld statute making it unlawful to sell pornography
to minors but not to adults). But see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d
721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). In
Marina Point, the landlord argued that the apartment complex did not lend itself
to the presence of children, similar to bars, adult bookstores and theatres. See id.
at 741, 640 P.2d at 127, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508. To this argument, the court stated
that "nothing in the nature of an ordinary apartment complex is incompatible with
the presence of families with children." Id.
113. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., concurring) (stating
that "zoning power is not a license for local communities to enact senseless and
arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply into private areas of protected family life").
114. See id. at 507 ("classifying family patterns in this eccentric way is not a
rational means of achieving the ends East Cleveland claims for its ordinance").
115. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
117. See Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Township, Inc. v. Weymouth Township,
71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976) (zoning ordinance which limited residency of
mobile homes to families where head of household was over age 52 did not violate
equal protection or due process); Shepard v. Woodland Township' Comm. and
Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977)
(zoning ordinance which permitted special use exception for retirement communities
and mandated that residency be restricted to persons aged 52 or older, except for
one child over age 18, did not violate equal protection or due process); Campbell
v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't 1977) (zoning ordinance
which limited residency to those aged 55 or older did not violate equal protection
guarantee). See generally Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and En-
forceability of Residential Segregation by Age, 76 MIcH. L. Rav. 64 (1977).
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that age is not a suspect classification ' 8 and that housing is not
a fundamental interest." 9 These cases resemble the factual setting
in Moore because a community is excluding families by utilizing its
zoning power. Despite this similarity, the courts have declined to
apply the higher scrutiny standard used in Moore. Instead, using
the rational basis test, state courts have upheld the ordinances.'
20
In the rental context, the affected individuals have less of a property
interest than do homeowners, and the discriminatory provision is found
in a lease as opposed to a zoning ordinance; thus state courts
will be even less likely to apply a higher scrutiny standard. Conse-
quently, courts will probably use a rational basis test and uphold child-
exclusion practices in rentals.
In Dubreuil v. West Winds Mobile Lodge,'2' plaintiffs attempted
to sell their mobile home to a family with two minor children. 22
Defendant West Winds, however, rejected the purchaser's application
because it had a policy restricting residency to those who were
eighteen years of age or older. 23 The plaintiffs contended that the
California Civil Code, which permitted adults-only mobile home
parks, was a denial of equal protection because the discrimination
between adults and minors limited the plaintiffs' access to housing.
24
118. See Weymouth, 71 N.J. at 280-87, 364 A.2d at 1033-37; Shepard, 71 N.J.
at 247-48, 364 A.2d at 1015; Campbell, 58 A.D.2d at 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 912-
13.
119. See Weymouth, 71 N.J. at 281-83, 287-88, 364 A.2d at 1033-34, 1037.
120. See Shepard, 71 N.J. at 247, 364 A.2d at 1015; see also Weymouth, 71 N.J. at
287-88, 364 A.2d at 1037; Campbell, 58 A.D.2d at 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13.
In Shepard, the court held "that the equal protection and due process clauses do
not require government to treat all persons identically. Rather, they require only
that differences in treatment must not be arbitrary or invidious, and that distinctions
must be justified by an appropriate state interest and bear a real and substantial
relationship to furthering governmental ends." Shepard, 71 N.J. at 247, 364 A.2d
at 1015 (citation omitted). In Campbell, the court stated "differences in treatment
on the basis of age will be sustained so long as the classification rationally furthers
a legitimate state objective." Campbell, 58 A.D.2d at 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 912
(citation omitted). See also Pomerantz v. Woodlands Section 8 Ass'n, Inc., No.
85-163, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (deed restriction prohibiting residency
by persons under 16 upheld pursuant to White Egret holding). In testifying to the
reasonableness of such a restriction, an expert witness stated that "an age restricted
community is an excellent way to increase the morale of older people and to limit
the amount of stimuli on them." Id.
121. 213 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
122. See id. at 14.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 17. The plaintiffs contended that a section of the California Civil
Code violated the equal protection clause. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 798.76 (West 1982).
Section 798.76 provides: "the management may require that a purchaser of a mobile
home which will remain in the park, comply with any rule or regulation limiting
residence to adults only." Id. But see Schmidt v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr.
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In this instance also, because courts generally do not consider age
to be a suspect class, nor the right to housing a fundamental right,
the court found that the statute could withstand an equal protection
attack if it was rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. 25
Accordingly, the court upheld the statute, stating that by "[e]ffectively
limiting residence to working or retired adults, the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate interest in providing quiet property enjoyment
by eliminating the noise and distractions children cause.' ' 26
The holdings of Moore and Halet have had little influence in
these cases; indeed, the courts disregarded them entirely. Moreover,
Halet was recently criticized in Hameetman v. City of Chicago.'27
In this case, a fireman was discharged for violating a city ordinance
requiring all civil employees to be residents of the city.' 28 Hameet-
man argued that the ordinance interfered with his constitutional right
to live with his family, because the well-being of his child' 29 required
him to live outside the city.'30
Because in this case the ordinance interfered only indirectly
with the right of family association-unlike Moore and Halet, in
which the interference was direct"3 -the court held that the regulation
was not an unconstitutional deprivation of Hameetman's right to live
with his family.' 3 2 The court then expressed its doubts over the Halet
decision:
Although an adults-only rental policy might in a rare case result
in [parents] living apart from their children, the real purpose and
dominant effect of such policies is not to break up families but
840 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In Schmidt, the plaintiff's application for admission
to a mobile home park was rejected because the plaintiff (who was 23 years old)
intended to live in the mobile home with her daughter and her younger sister, and
the park had a restriction prohibiting residency by persons under age 25. See 215
Cal. Rptr. at 841-42. In its interpretation of California's Civil Code section 798.76,
which did not specify the meaning of the term "adult," the court concluded that
the legislature intended to "allow the proprietor of a mobile home park to draft
rules excluding children only where the facility is reserved for senior citizens" and,
therefore, the court struck down this restriction. Id. at 845.
125. See Dubreuil, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
126. Id. at 18, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 18. But see Schmidt v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). See supra note 124 for a discussion of
the holding in Schmidt.
127. See 776 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 639.
129. The plaintiff testified that his child was hyperkinetic and had to attend
school outside the city. See id. at 642.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 643.
132. See id.
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to spare people who do not have young children of their own
the noise and commotion of other people's children; the incidental
effects on families with small children must be very small.'33
The court went on to state the major difficulties surrounding this
issue, noting that "the case law in this area, maybe because the
subject matter is so emotional and the constitutional guideposts so
sparse, is untidy.'1 4
III. Utilization of the Fair Housing Act to Combat Child-
Exclusion Practices
A recent phenomenon in Fair Housing Act litigation involves the
use of the Act in child-exclusion cases-although plaintiffs using the
Act in this way have faced several obstacles. A bill to amend the
Act would include families with children as a protected class under
the Act. The next two sections will discuss the issues involved in each
of these developments.
A. Child-Exclusion Practices as Having a Disparate Impact on
Minorities and Females
Studies have shown that black families and those headed by women
are more than twice as likely as other families to rent, rather than
buy, their homes.'35 Moreover, in large cities, rental buildings in
predominantly white neighborhoods are more than twice as likely to
have no-children policies. 3 6 These statistics have led some commen-
tators to state that discrimination against children is a "subtle blind"
for race and sex discrimination. 3 7 The Fair Housing Act protects,
among other groups, minorities and women from housing discrim-
ination.' Consequently, two recent cases were brought under the
Fair Housing Act'39 in which the plaintiffs challenged a landlord's
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Edelman, supra note 8, at A23, col. 2.
136. See id. at A23, cols. 2, 3; see also MEASURING RESTRICTwE RENTAL PRAcTIcES,
supra note 7, at 34. The survey revealed that 28.9% of apartments in predominantly
white neighborhoods excluded families, whereas only 17.5% of apartments in pre-
dominantly black neighborhoods excluded families. Id.; cf. Greene & Blake, supra
note 4, at 3-4. The authors compared minorities with an income of over $15,000
to their white counterparts and found that minorities had more frequent problems
with these adults-only policies. See id. Thus the authors stated that "[t]his raises
the questions as to whether at times no-children policies are a smoke screen for
racial discrimination." Id.
137. See Edelman, supra note 8, at A23, col. 2; see supra note 136.
138. See The Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982).
139. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Halet v.
Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
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adults-only rental policy as having a "disparate impact"'140 on mi-
norities. In these cases, uncertainty surrounded the issues of (1) stand-
ing; and (2) the nature of the burden on the plaintiffs in establishing
a prima facie case.
1. Standing Under the Fair Housing Act
Because only the rights of certain classes, for instance women
and minorities, are protected under the Act, it follows that the
only parties permitted to challenge an adults-only restriction in hous-
ing as having a discriminatory effect are those classes protected
under the Act.14 1 In at least one child-discrimination case, however,
the court permitted a non-protected party to assert the rights of
others under the Act.
142
In Halet v. Wend Investment Co., the plaintiff claimed that the
landlord's policy was racially discriminatory and violated the four-
teenth amendment and several federal statutes, including the Fair
Housing Act. 43 Alleging a violation of the Act under a "discrim-
inatory effects" standard,'" the plaintiff contended that the adults-
only policy would have a greater impact on blacks and other mi-
norities, because their households were more likely to contain chil-
dren. 45 Despite the fact that the plaintiff was white, the Ninth
Circuit held that he had standing to bring a claim of racial dis-
crimination under the Act. 46 The court held that, regardless of race,
any party injured by such discrimination has standing to bring a
140. For the purposes of this Note, "disparate impact" is used synonymously
with "disproportionate impact."
141. See The Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982) ("it
shall be unlawful [to] . . .deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin"). See generally Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair
Housing Cases, 41 OHIO STATE L.J. 1 (1980); Calmore, Fair Housing and the
Black Poor: An Advocacy Guide, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 609, 616-18 (1984)
[hereinafter Calmore].
142. See Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
143. See id. at 1307.
144. See infra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different
standards of review utilized in order to make out a prima facie case under the
Fair Housing Act.
145. See 672 F.2d at 1311. The court set forth the percentage of black, hispanic,
white and female-headed households with children. See id. at 1311 n.6.
146. See id. at 1309. The court determined that the standing requirement of Article
III is only that the person bringing suit have been injured by the conduct. See id.
at 1308. The Supreme Court, however, has required that a party assert its own
rights and not those of third persons. See id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); .Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975)). Under the Act, however, Halet would not have any right to assert since
he was not a member of one of the protected classes under the Act. See supra
note 141 for a list of the protected classes under the Act.
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cause of action under the Act.'47 Accordingly, a party does not
necessarily have to be a member of one of the protected classes
under the Act in order to challenge a landlord's discrimination against
children.
2. The Prima Facie Case
The federal courts, in addressing claims brought pursuant to the
Fair Housing Act, have allowed plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case
under two theories: showing discriminatory intent or showing
discriminatory impact.' An example of a case involving the
discriminatory impact theory is Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates.'"9
In Betsey, tenants brought an action under the Fair Housing Act
after their landlord attempted to evict them in order to institute an
adults-only rental policy in their building, which was part of a three
building complex. 150 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' at-
tempts to evict them were motivated by racial discrimination'' and
argued that the evictions would have a disparate racial impact, which
would violate the Act. 52
On the discriminatory intent claim, the lower court found that
the reasons furnished by the defendants for the conversion were valid
economic considerations, 3' thereby refuting the plaintiffs' prima facie
showing of racial discrimination. 5 4 In addressing the discriminatory
impact claim,'55 the court found that the percentage of black renters
in the complex exceeded the percentages of black renters in both
the election district and in the county. 56 Thus, the representation
147. See Halet, 672 F.2d at 1309. The court, however, reasoned that "Congress
expanded standing under that Act to the full extent of Article III." Id. Also, the
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Act who has
suffered an actual injury may assert that the rights of another are infringed. See
id. (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 103
n.9 (1979) (footnote omitted)).
148. See infra note 169 for a discussion of the different standards required for
a prima facie showing of discrimination under the Act.
149. 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
150. See id. at 985.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 986. The district court found a prima facie showing of discriminatory
intent. See id.
154. See id.
155. In its opinion, the court stated "that it was 'unnecessary' under these
circumstances to consider whether the tenants had proved a prima facie case of
discriminatory impact." Betsey, 736 F.2d at 986. In dicta, the court stated that it
did not believe the plaintiffs had proved discriminatory impact. See id. Later, upon the
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the discriminatory impact claim, the court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove discriminatory impact. See id.
156. See id. at 986-87.
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of blacks in the complex was greater than in the community as a
whole. 157 Moreover, the court stated that although the immediate
effect would be a disproportionate impact on blacks, the plaintiffs
had failed to show that the policy would cause long-term segregated
housing patterns in the complex.' Based on these findings, the
lower court held that the plaintiffs had failed to make the requisite
prima facie showing of discriminatory impact. 5 9
The Fourth Circuit, however, held that the lower court's rejection
of the discriminatory impact claim was erroneous.' 60 The court set
forth the requirements necessary to bring a discriminatory impact
claim: (1) that the plaintiffs be members of a discrete minority; and
(2) that the policy would have a discriminatory impact on them as
individuals.' 6' The court 'stated that the correct inquiry was whether
the policy had a disproportionate impact on the minority residents
of the plaintiff's building-i.e., the total group to which the policy
was applied-rather than the impact on the county or the complex
as a whole. 62 The court stated that the plaintiffs' statistics 63 estab-
lished a disparate impact according to the United States Supreme
Court standards of statistical significance. 64 The court remanded the
157. See id.
158. See id. at 986.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 987. The court stated that the district court's decision was based
on three factors that were totally irrelevant to a showing of discriminatory impact:
"the absence of a continuing disproportionate impact, the high percentage of blacks
in the entire complex, and the insignificant impact of the policy on blacks in the
local community." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The court drew an analogy to the Supreme Court's holding in Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). Specifically, in Teal, the Court stated that "[tihe
principal focus of the statute [Title VII] is the protection of the individual employee,
rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole." Teal, 457 U.S. at
453-54. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the objectives of Title VII and
Title VIII are "parallel," the same focus would apply to a Title VIII case. Betsey,
736 F.2d at 987 (citing Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir.
1982) ("some courts have reasoned that since the anti-discrimination objectives of
Title VIII are parallel to the goals of Title VII, the Griggs rationale must be
applied in Fair Housing Act cases") (citations omitted); Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977) (court
noted that objective of Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities" and objective of Title VIII was to promote "open, integrated residential
housing patterns," and therefore, both have been construed broadly), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1025 (1978), aff'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980)).
163. Approximately 54% of the non-white tenants received eviction notices, as
opposed to only 14%o of the white tenants. See Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988.
164. See 736 F.2d at 988 n.4 (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In
Castenada, the Supreme Court used a "rule of exclusion test" and compared the
amount of the affected class in that population as a whole with the amount of the
affected class in the situation claimed to have discriminatory effect, and found that
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case and instructed the district court to uphold the practice if the
defendant proved a "compelling business necessity" for its adults-
only policy. 165
Although this Note does not intend to cover all the requirements
necessary to bring a successful Fair Housing Act claim, 166 it is
important to note the uncertainty that still persists as to the showing
a plaintiff must make to establish his prima facie case under the
Act. 1 67 One commentator has suggested that the legislative history
of the Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to use the
"effects standard' 6 8 and points out that most circuits apply this
standard without requiring a showing of a discriminatory intent. 69
a prima facie case is made with as little as a 15%70 differential. Id. at 494-96; see
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) ("a fluctua-
tion of more than two or three standard deviations would undercut the hypothesis
that decisions were being made randomly with respect to race") (citation omitted)).
165. See 736 F.2d at 988-89 (citing Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No.
11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[iln a disparate impact case, . . . we
have said that the employer must prove business necessity for the challenged practice
to rebut the prima facie case .... [tlhe practice must be essential, the purpose
compelling") (citations omitted); and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) ("Itlhe touchstone is business necessity")). The court adopted the "com-
pelling business necessity" test which is the test utilized in employment discrimination
cases. See Betsey, 736 F.2d at 989 (citing Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1188
(4th Cir. 1982) (" 'test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose' ") (citations omitted); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798(4th Cir.) ("the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any
racial impact")), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), vacated without opinion sub
nom. Wright v. Olin Corp., 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
One author has stated that "[tihis 'business necessity' test ... would require
that defendant present independent and objective evidence that the adults-only policy
furthers a legitimate business purpose and is necessary for the safe and efficient
operations of the business." Recent Fair Housing Act Litigation: Betsey v. Turtle
Creek Associates, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 640, 641 (1984); see also Note, Business
Necessity in Title VI: Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the
Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (1986) [hereinafter Business Necessity].
166. See generally Note, Fundamental Issues in Housing Discrimination Litigation,
14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 555 (1984) [hereinafter Fundamental Issues]; Calmore, supra
note 141, at 609.
167. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
168. See Fundamental Issues, supra note 166, at 582.
169. See id. at 583, n.270 (citing Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055,
1065 (4th Cir. 1982) (court uses Arlington II analysis); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672
F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (court mentions possiblity of utilizing discriminatory
effect standard but decides to wait until record was more fully developed); Robinson
v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1979) (court hedges in using
only discriminatory effects standard by stating: "[ilt is clear, therefore, that even
were a motivation test to be applied, plaintiff has established a prima facie case");
United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) ("a significant dis-
criminatory effect flowing from rental decisions is sufficient to demonstrate a
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The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue,
although it has required a showing of intent under sections 198270
and 1981.171
violation of the Fair Housing Act"); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977) ("we are convinced that a Title VIII claim must rest, in
the first instance, upon a showing that the challenged action by defendant had a
racially discriminatory effect"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)(Arlington I) ("attempts to discern the intent of an entity ... are at best problematic
. . . .[w]e therefore hold that at least under some circumstances a violation of section
3604(a) can be established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing
of discriminatory intent"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), on remand, 469 F.
Supp. 836 (N.D. Il. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980) (Arlington I);
Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976) (court uses
the discriminatory effects standard); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff need only show conduct resulted in discrim-
ination), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co.,
484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973) ("it is not necessary to show that [realtor]
intended to deprive [plaintiffs] of rights granted by the Act. A violation occurred
because his words had that effect"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, on remand, 377
F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 537 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1976).
Arlington II used the discriminatory effects test only after the court has analyzed
four questions:
(1) [Hlow strong is the plaintiffs showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is
there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy
the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; (3) what is the
defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does the
plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing
for members of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from
interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing.
Arlington 11, 558 F.2d at 1290.
It appears that the only two circuits which have held that discriminatory effects
alone are sufficient to make out a prima facie case are the Third and Eighth
Circuits. See Keith v. Volpe, 618 F. Supp. 1132, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 1985). However,
the Fourth Circuit must be added when the defendant is a private individual. See
Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 n.5 (four-prong Clarkton test not applicable when defendant
was private individual); see also Schwartz, Poverty Law, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16, 1984,
at 1, col. 1. The author reported that although the Supreme Court has not ruled
on this issue, most circuits have agreed "that the Griggs prima facie case principles
of Title VII are applicable in Title VIII actions. In addition to the Fourth Circuit,
this includes decisions of the Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits." Id. at
2, col. 1. The author also stated that the Second Circuit followed suit in Robinson
v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979). See id. at 2, cols. 1-2.
See generally Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54
NOTRE DAE L. REv. 199 (1978); Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect
Under the Fair Housing Act.: A Search For the Proper Standard, 27 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 398 (1979); Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII
Litigation, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128 (1976). See also Calmore, supra note
141, at 625-26.
170. See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119 (1981).
171. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,
389 (1982).
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Finally, the federal circuits have differed on what kind of a
justification the defendant must present in order to rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie showing.' 2 In Betsey, the court required that the
defendant assert a compelling business necessity for the challenged
eviction." 3 Thus, since this case was the first and only case involving
discrimination against children that was decided under the Act, it could
set the precedent for the cases that follow.
Because an action under the Fair Housing Act does not require
a showing of state action, 74 and therefore permits a plaintiff to
challenge purely private discriminatory acts, the amended Act would
provide a remedy for a large number of families seeking redress
from child discrimination. 75 Nevertheless, the Act has been inef-
fective in its administration and does not meet the desired goal of
its framers. 176
The Fair Housing Act declares as its policy "to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States,""' but it has not been effectively enforced and thus falls far
short of its declared goal.'78 Furthermore, less than one percent of
the instances of discrimination are brought to the attention of the
complaint system of the Housing and Urban Development (HUD).' 9
172. When the defendant is a private individual, "most courts in Title VIII cases
have adopted their circuit's Title VII formulations of business necessity." Business
Necessity, supra note 165, at 580 n.l18 (citing Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Co., 536 F.2d 231, 235-
36 (8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974)). When the defendant is a public entity, however,
the courts have used different language in weighing the justification offered by the
defendant against the interests of the plaintiff. See Business Necessity, supra note
165, at 602-05.
173. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1984).
174. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969) (no
state action limitation); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439
(1968) (same).
175. Studies have found that females and minorities, two of the protected classes
under the Act, are the groups affected most by these child exclusion practices
because of their increased representation in the rental market. See Ridings, Dis-
crimination Against Women in Housing Finance, in A SHELTERED CRISIS: THE
STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 104, 107 (1983).
176. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6152, 6152-53 (1983);
infra notes 179-80.
177. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 801, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
178. See supra note 176; infra notes 179-80.
179. For instance, approximately 4,500 discrimination in housing complaints are
presented to HUD. HUD diverts two-thirds of these complaints to local agencies
and attempts to resolve one-third of the remaining complaints. Approximately one-
half of the 500 complaints are successfully conciliated. See S. 2040, 99th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 848, 850 (1986).
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The ineffective enforcement of the statute may be explained by the
lack of financial incentives for private parties to bring claims under
the Act, and the absence of a quick and inexpensive forum in which
to hear housing discrimination complaints.8 0
B. The Proposed Bill to Amend the Fair Housing Act to
Include Families with Children as a Protected Class
In May, 1983, February, 1986, and February, 1987, a group of
congressmen, headed by Senators Mathias and Kennedy, introduced
a bill to the Senate that would amend the Fair Housing Act so
that it could better achieve its desired goals.'' The bill would
strengthen the Act's enforcement mechanisms, by appointing ad-
ministrative law judges to hear complaints, and providing economic
incentives to injured parties in order to encourage the filing of
claims.' 82 Furthermore, the bill would include handicapped persons and
families with children as protected classes under the Act." 3 The
strong lobbying power of the National Association of Realtors, which
vigorously opposes the bill, has led to tremendous dispute over the
issue of whether to extend protection to families." 4 The Association's
strong opposition makes it imperative to determine whether the amend-
ment, which would protect familial status, could withstand constitu-
tional attack.
The Act has been upheld as a valid exercise of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment,8 5 which grants Congress the power
180. The bill to amend the Act gives an administrative law judge the authority
to award compensatory damages for the "pain, humiliation and suffering" and
also punitive damages. See S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 850
(1986). Furthermore, the bill establishes administrative courts as the "back-up" to
the conciliation process. See id. The 1983 bill proposes an award of a civil penalty
of $10,000 and reasonable attorney and expert witnesses' fees. See S. 1220, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6152, 6153 (1983).
181. S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6152 (1983); see S. 2040,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 848 (1986); see also S. 558, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2256 (1987).
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6152, 6155 (1983); see
also S. 2040, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REc. 848, 851 (1986); S. 558, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 2256 (1987).
184. Telephone interview with staff member of House Judiciary Committee (Mar.
14, 1986).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Section 1 provides: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Section 2 provides:
"Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
Id.
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"to eliminate the 'badges and incidents of slavery,' "1186 by "bar[ring]
all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale and
rental of real property."98 7
One commentator has noted that the Fair Housing Act is consistently
read as thirteenth amendment legislation188 and "that the lack of
a firm base of thirteenth amendment authority was the reason Con-
gress left obscure the constitutional basis of the Fair Housing Act's
proscription on sex discrimination. ' 189 Although it has been stated
that "Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment
rationally to [define] what are the badges and the incidents of
slavery,"' 190 a literal reading of the amendment would require that
the plaintiff suing under this provision allege a condition of slavery
and involuntary servitude.' 9'
Not all the protected classes under the Act meet this criterion,
however, because sex, religion, handicap, and familial status do not
encompass the traditional notions of the conditions of slavery or
involuntary servitude. Furthermore, it appears that the thirteenth
amendment is the exclusive constitutional provision authorizing
congressional action against private discrimination in housing.8 2 Never-
theless, no one has mounted a challenge to Congress' constitutional
authority to protect persons on the basis of their sex or religion.
186. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (emphasis in
original); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Morgan v. Parcener's Ltd.-Partnership, 493 F. Supp.
180, 182 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Meadows v. Edgewood Management Corp., 432 F.
Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Va. 1977); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305,
1313 (D. Md. 1969).
187. United States v. L & H Land Corp., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 576, 579 (S.D.
Fla. 1976); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Real Estate Dev.
Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Miss. 1972); see also United States v. Mintzes,
304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969). But see United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629, 640-42 (1883) (Congress exceeded its authority under~the 13th amendment by
enacting statute that would be applied to protect whites against discrimination).
188. See Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Au-
thority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 313, 323 n.51 (1977) [hereinafter Calhoun].
189. Id. (citing Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUSTON L. REV. 844 (1975)).
190. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
191. But see Calhoun, supra note 188, at 355-56. The author argues that the
Supreme Court's holding in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273 (1976), no longer requires Congress to prohibit discrimination under the thir-
teenth amendment only with regard "to the current or former inferior legal status
of the class discriminated against." Id. at 356.
192. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969)
(holding that section 3604(e) of the Fair Housing Act was not within Congressional
authority under commerce clause or § 5 of fourteenth amendment).
[Vol. XV
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
The lack of litigation concerning Congress' authority to protect
individuals from sex and religious discrimination in housing makes
it unlikely that anyone will challenge the protection of families as
unconstitutional legislation. Moreover, the language in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,19 concerning the power of Congress to enact leg-
islation under the thirteenth amendment that touches on "funda-
mental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,"' 194 leads one
to conclude that Congress' protection of families would be upheld
as a "rational means of effectuating the stated policy of the legislation
'to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.' "19 By utilizing its broad enforcement
powers under the thirteenth amendment, as interpreted by the Jones
Court, Congress would merely be preventing unreasonable restraints
on the fundamental right of privacy concerning family living ar-
rangements and the right to procreate without undue hardship.' 96
At present, the bill has been referred to the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 19 but
has not had a full hearing.' 98 When introduced in 1983, it had thirty-
nine supporters,' 99 but upon reintroduction in 1986, this number had
dwindled to thirty-two.2"' Although many supporters are fighting for
its passage, the power of the National Association of Realtors is over-
shadowing their efforts.2"' Therefore, since it is unlikely that the bill
will pass, it will be important to pass state legislation designed to
accomplish the goals set forth in the proposed bill.
IV. Local Legislative Attempts to Combat the Problem
and Recommended Changes
Prior to 1979, only six states had enacted statutes declaring child
exclusion practices to be illegal and void as against public policy.202
193. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
194. Id. at 441 (citation omitted).
195. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969) (citation
omitted).
196. See Calhoun, supra note 188, at 323 n.51 for the arguments asserted for
expanding Congress' power under the thirteenth amendment.
197. Telephone interview with staff member of House Judiciary Committee (Mar.
14, 1986).
198. Id.
199. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 6152 (1983).
200. S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 848 (1986). But see S. 558,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 2256 (1987) (38 supporters).
201. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 6152 (1983) (supporter's
letters); supra note 184.
202. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1986); AmIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317
(1974 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1975 & Supp. 1986); ILL.
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Because of the publicity23 and public concern surrounding this issue,
and the efforts of local activist groups, 204 an additional nine states
have recently adopted statutes that ban this discrimination. 205 Of the
sixteen states that have passed legislation, the statutes in Alaska,
Arizona, Maine, 206 Rhode Island, and Virginia provide little or no
relief to the victims of child discrimination. 207 Instead, they are
inadequate because they exempt adults-only complexes from their
coverage without regard to the age of the inhabitants. 208 Therefore,
landlords can effectively exclude children without violating the stat-
utes simply by designating their complexes as adults-only dwellings,
or by registering their buildings with their respective state housing
commissions as adults-only residences.
20 9
These statutes take a variety of approaches, ranging from a state-
ment that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice and a civil rights
violation to discriminate against families with children210 to a clas-
ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 3-104 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
151B, § 4(11) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236,
237 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp.
1986).
203. Articles have appeared in U.S. News and World Report, The Wall Street
Journal, The New York Times, and the National Law Journal. See Protests are
Mounting Over "Adults-Only" Rentals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 4, 1980,
at 58; Edelman, supra note 8, at A23, col. 2 [hereinafter Protests Are Mounting];
Lublin, supra note 7, at 35, col. 3; Granelli, "Adults-Only" Housing Suffers Judicial
Setbacks, Nat'l L.J. Mar. 1, 1982, at 5, col. 1; see also Morris & Block, The
Conversion of Apartment Buildings To All-Adult Tenancy May Be Illegal, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 20, col. 3.
204. James B. Morales, Staff Attorney at the National Center for Youth Law,
1663 Mission Street, San Franscisco Ca., 94103, has been very vocal in his attempts
to ban child discrimination in housing.
205. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.2 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-64a (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2515(c), 45-2555 (1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6027 (Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11)
(Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.265 (West Supp. 1987)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(V)(a) (Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-
4(E) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-88 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
206. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6027 (Supp. 1985) (an adults-only
complex must reserve 250%0 of the complex for families).
207. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240(1), (2) (1986) ("nothing in this paragraph
prohibits the sale, lease or rental of classes of real property commonly known as
housing for 'singles' or 'married' couples"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(b)
(Supp. 1986) (guilty of petty offense if rent to persons with children in violation
of restrictive covenant covering an exclusive adult subdivision); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
34-37-4 (E)(5)(e) (Supp. 1986) ("[n]othing . . . shall be construed to affect a housing
accommodation in . . . adults-only housing complexes"); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-
88 (Supp. 1986) ("it shall not be an unlawful discriminatory housing practice to
operate an all-adult or all-elderly housing community").
208. See suprd notes 206-07 for a list of these statutes.
209. See id.
210. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.2 (West Supp. 1987) (violation of Unruh Civil
Rights Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64a(a) (West Supp. 1986) (unlawful
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sification of the landlord's discriminatory practice as a misdemeanor
or a petty offense.2" Some states impose civil penalties that range
from twenty-five dollars for a first offense to two thousand dollars
for subsequent offenses. 212 The exemptions from compliance with
these statutes invariably include housing for the elderly and two-
family to five-family owner-occupied dwellings. 213
An absolute ban on child-exclusion practices in these statutes is
impracticable because at least twenty-five percent of the rental units
on the market are not designed for habitation by families. 21 4 Also,
landlords are always permitted to reject individuals in accordance
with local occupancy laws. 21 5 Nevertheless, present statutory schemes
discriminatory practice); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2515(c), 45-2555 (1981) (same);
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 68, para. 3-104 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (civil rights violation);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, § 6027 (Supp. 1986) (unlawful housing discrimination);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986) (unlawful
discriminatory practice); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(V)(a) (1984) (same);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4 (1984 & Supp. 1986) (unlawful housing practice); VA.
CODE ANN. § 36-88 (1984 & Supp. 1986) (unlawful discriminatory practice).
211. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.270 (1986) (misdemeanor and fine of $500 and/
or 30 days imprisonment); AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (Supp. 1986) (petty
offense and civil penalty up to three times monthly rent); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 236 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987) (misdemeanor and fine of $50-$100); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-102 (West Supp. 1986) (civil penalty of $200 for first offense
and $500 for subsequent offenses).
212. Connecticut's statute provides for a fine of $25-$100. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-64a(c) (1986). In contrast, Maine's statute provides for a fine of $1000
for a first offense and $2000 for all subsequent offenses. See ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(B)(7) (Supp. 1986).
213. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 51.2(a) (West Supp. 1987) (elderly); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-64a(b)(1)(a), (b) (West 1986) (two and four family owner-occupied);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503(d) (Supp. 1986) (elderly); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
2515(c)(3) (1981) (elderly); id. § 1-2518 (1981) (owner-occupied two-family or five-
family sharing bath or kitchen facilities); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 3-106(B)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (five-family owner-occupied); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 4613(4)(e) (Supp. 1986) (seniors over 62); id. § 4613(4)(a) (Supp. 1986) (five-
family owner-occupied); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(11)(1), (3) (Law Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1986) (three-family dwelling occupied by elderly in which presence of child
would be hardship); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(V)(b)-(d) (1984 & Supp.
1986) (age 45 and older and less than three-family); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101
(West Supp. 1986) (federally financed senior citizen retirement commmunity); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (a)(l), (2) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987) (senior citizen
community financed by federal government and mobile home parks for those aged
55 or older and two-family owner-occupied); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4(E)(5)(a),
(d) (Supp. 1986) (seniors and two-family owner-occupied).
214. Protests Are Mounting, supra note 203, at 58, col. 3.
215. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(D) (Supp. 1986) ("[nlothing
in this section shall prohibit a person from refusing to rent a dwelling by reason
of reasonable occupancy standards"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6027(1)
(Supp. 1986) ("[a] landlord may refuse to rent a dwelling unit to a family if the
size of the family, with children, would exceed the number permitted by local
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fail to provide an effective enforcement mechanism for the remaining
apartments on the market that are suitable for family living.21 6 It
is necessary to amend these statutes if they are to provide a realistic
deterrent to landlords' child-exclusion practices.
A. The Ineffectiveness of Current Statutes
The lack of litigation utilizing the state statutes that prohibit child-
exclusion practices by landlords has been noticeable.2" 7 One may
attribute this fact to the ineffective enforcement of these statu-
tory rights by the parties empowered to protect them. A statute
may place the power of enforcement in: (1) the states' attorneys; 218
(2) the parties injured by this discrimination; 21 9 (3) the states' fair
employment and housing commissions; 220 or a combination of these
entities.221 As discussed below, problems in enforcement by each of
zoning or other municipal ordinance or reasonable standards of human health,
safety or sanitation"); R.I. GEN. LAW § 34-37-4(E)(7) (Supp. 1986) (landlord
may reject when number of persons is more than twice number of bedrooms).
Recently, landlords have started to use occupancy standards that are more re-
strictive than local occupancy laws in order to discriminate against families with
children. See Morales, Restrictive Occupancy Standards: Landlords Find New Ways
to Discriminate Against Children, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 152 (1986) [hereinafter
Restrictive Occupancy Standards]. See infra note 241 for a discussion of the theories
used to strike down this practice.
216. See infra notes 217-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposals
to make these statutes attain their objective.
It is important to note, however, that one study found that over 25% of two-
bedroom apartments excluded families with one child, one-third excluded families
with two children, and 60% excluded families with three children. See MEASURING
RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 71.
217. See Pardy v. Fountainhead Owners Corp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 14,
col.4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County) (child discrimination by a co-op board is not
in violation of New York Real Property Law § 236 since law only applies to
rentals); Gilman v. Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 180 A.2d 365 (1962); Boyd H.
Wood, Co. v. Finkelstein, 193 Misc. 315, 84 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1948); see also People v. Metcoff, 392 Ill. 418, 64 N.E.2d 867 (1946).
218. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text for a list of the statutes that
place the power of enforcement in the state attorney general.
219. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(C) (Supp. 1986); CAL. Crv. CODE§ 52(c) (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-98a (West 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503(c) (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. §1-2556(a) (1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4551 (Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 9 (Law.
Co-op. 1975); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-102 (West Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-5(L)(2) (1984);
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-94(b) (1984).
220. See supra note 210 and accompanying text for a list of the statutes which
place the power of enforcement in the state's fair employment and housing com-
missions.
221. For instance, New York's statute gives the Attorney General the enforcement
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these entities severely hinder the possible elimination of this
discriminatory practice.22
1. Problems with the Assertion of These Rights by a State's
Attorney or an Injured Party
It is difficult to ascertain the primary cause of a lack of suits
brought by states' attorneys or injured parties against landlords who
discriminate against families with children. A combination of factors
may account for the lack of enforcement of the statutes. As discussed
below, a general ignorance of the statutes' existence, the difficulty
of proving discrimination, and the lack of financial incentives, are
the primary causes for the lack of cases.
One factor that helps to explain the lack of enforcement of these
statutes is that if a landlord's discrimination against children is made
a criminal offense or violation under the statute, a state attorney would
still be unlikely to prosecute the landlord. 23 Even if a state's attorney
were to prosecute a landlord, the landlord could be convicted only
of a misdemeanor and fined a minimal amount, which would not
deter the landlord from future violations.22'
Prior to its amendment, the Illinois statute placed the power of
enforcement in the state's attorney general. 225 Based on this statute,
an Illinois survey revealed that statutes that make child discrimination
a criminal offense lack a deterrent effect. 226 The survey found that
seventy-eight percent of the discriminating landlords were unaware
that the statute existed. 221 More important, forty-eight percent stated
that they were unconcerned about violating the law.2 8 It was not
determined whether the landlords' lack of concern was related to
power but also permits a private cause of action. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§§ 236, 237 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1986). Furthermore, California's Civil Code
Section 52 gives an injured party a private cause of action, or the right to file a
verified complaint with the Department of Fair Employment & Housing. See CAL.
Crv. CODE § 52(a), (c), (f) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
222. See infra notes 223-97 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text for a list of statutes which
give states' attorneys general the enforcement power.
224. See id.
225. See ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 14, para. 5 (Smith-Hurd 1963); see also id. ch. 80,
paras. 37, 38 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
226. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment For Rent-Children Not Allowed: The
Illinois Children in Housing Statute-Its Viability and a Proposal For Its Com-
prehensive Amendment, 25 DEPAuL L. REV. 64, 78-79 (1975) [hereinafter Apartment
For Rent].
227. See id. at 79.
228. See id.
1987]
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the minimal penalty imposed (i.e., $50-$100), or their belief that
they would be safe from prosecution for their actions.
229
Other studies have shown that the certainty of prosecution creates
a greater deterrent effect than the severity of the punishment.
20
Enforcement of the Illinois statute provided neither certainty nor
severity of punishment, because not one landlord was prosecuted
despite evidence of widespread discrimination2 1 and a penalty of fifty
dollars was not severe enough to deter the landlords' clild-exclusion
practices. 3
The survey set forth two possible explanations for the lack of
any criminal prosecutions. First, approximately forty-nine percent of
the state's attorneys admitted their ignorance of the statute's exist-
ence. 233 Second, "an average of less than [forty] minutes per county
per year [was] spent investigating and prosecuting the statute."23
Thus, the lack of a single case brought by a state's attorney, as
well as any deterrent effect of the statute shows the need for an
alternative to criminal prosecution.
One alternative would be a private cause of action. Even if
the statute allowed a private party to bring a cause of action,
however, the time and expense of litigating the case would deter
many individuals from pursuing this avenue of enforcement. 235 Fur-
thermore, seventy-eight percent of the persons polled in the Illinois
survey were unaware that a state law existed prohibiting the practice
of child-exclusion.23 6 Thus, the ignorance of the general population,
as well as a probable reluctance to bring suit, may help explain the
lack of litigation under these statutes.
Recent publications and the efforts of the National Association
for Youth Law have increased the awareness of the population.23
7
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Antunes and Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Analysis, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 486, 488-89 n.25 (1973) ("[s]everity alone is simply
irrelevant to the control of deviance"); id. at 489 ("severity of punishment exhibits
a moderate deterrent impact on homicide rates, but is unrelated to crime rates for
other types of crimes").
231. The authors found that only two complaints were filed during the years
1970-1975, see Apartment for Rent, supra note 226, at 83, and that no prosecutions
occurred during the years 1970-74 despite the finding that 21.11% of the rental
advertisements discriminated against children under the age of 14. See id. at 78
n.69.
232. See ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 80, para. 38 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (misdemeanor and a
fine of $50-4100).
233. See Apartment For Rent, supra note 226, at 83.
234. Id. (emphasis in original).
235. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
236. See Apartment for Rent, supra note 226 at 77.
237. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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Even if an individual is aware that a landlord violated his rights,
however, "[people are] more interested in moving than suing."23
To most people, litigation seems complex, time consuming, and
expensive.239 In addition, the type of damages awarded in these cases
fails to provide an adequate remedy for injured parties.24 A final
problem with a private cause of action is the difficulty plaintiffs
encounter in attempting to prove an act of discrimination.2 4 There-
238. See Davis, State Must Fight Housing Discrimination Against Children, L.A.
Daily J., Jan. 16, 1985, at 4, col. 2 [hereinafter Davis].
239. For instance, in the case of Marina Point, the attorney for the plaintiff
had worked full-time on the case for two years and planned to petition the court
for several hundred thousand dollars in attorney's fees. See Granelli, "Adults Only"
Housing Suffers Judicial Setbacks, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 20, col. 2 [hereinafter
Granelli]; see also Davis, supra note 238, at 2, col. 4; The Sacramento Bee, The
Child Next Door, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 29, 1984, at 4, col. 1 ("[ajnd though
victimized families can take their complaints to court, that remedy is too costly
and time-consuming to be useful").
240. See infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type
of damages awarded in these cases.
241. For example, if the statute imposed criminal sanctions, the attorney general
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an act of discrimination
occurred. See People v. Metcoff, 392 Il. 418, 64 N.E.2d 867 (1946). In Metcoff,
the state failed to meet this burden because the act of discrimination had occurred
over the phone and the plaintiff could not identify the voice, having never met the
landlord in person. See id. at 420-21, 64 N.E.2d at 868. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that a disinterested person would look at an apartment; therefore, it is difficult
for a plaintiff to produce a credible witness later at the trial. See Apartment for
Rent, supra note 226, at 71. Furthermore, even a checker's testimony is sometimes
challenged as biased. See Calmore, supra note 141, at 629. For instance, in one
case, the court observed that "when one has an interest in the outcome of a case
or harbors strong feelings against a party or the conduct challenged, there is a
tendency to shape one's sensory perceptions or reactions to fit the testimony one
desires to give." Id.
In addition, if an attorney general investigates a complaint, an intricate procedure
is utilized in order to prove the discrimination. See Apartment for Rent, supra
note 226, at 71 n.35. The "sandwich investigation" involves three teams. See id.
The first team poses as a married couple without children. See id. The second
team poses as a married couple with children the same number and ages as the
victim's. See id. Finally a third team poses as a married couple without children.
See id. Thus, an enormous amount of time and manpower is necessary to prove
this discrimination, perhaps explaining why the attorney general's office gives these
cases low priority. See supra note 234 and accompanying text for an example of
the amount of time spent per year investigating these complaints. See Apartment
for Rent, supra note 226, at 85 n.91 ("[tlo my knowledge D.A.'s in large cities
accord low priority to prosecution of such complaints (New York)").
A new vehicle for child discrimination has emerged which requires the type of
statistics necessary to prove disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act. See
Restrictive Occupancy Standards, supra note 215, at 153. Landlords have started
to impose occupancy standards which are more restrictive than the local occupancy
laws. See id. at 152. In states that statutorily prohibit child discrimination, injured
parties can claim that the occupancy standard has a disparate impact on families
with children. See id.
1987]
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fore, to encourage private enforcement of these rights, state legislators
should amend statutes to provide for financial incentives '42 and relax
existing evidentiary rules.
2 43
2. The Establishment of a Fair Housing Commission
A middle ground between a criminal offense statute2 44 and one
that provides for a private cause of action2 45 would be an amendment
to the states' human rights statutes that would give departments of
Fair Housing and Employment authority to receive complaints in-
volving child discrimination. A fair housing commission would have
the capability to remedy ignorance about this discrimination and
decrease the expense associated with a private cause of action.246 As
previously noted, the individuals most likely to be victims of dis-
crimination by landlords are women and minorities. 247 These classes
of individuals are also the most likely to be indigent and unable to
In Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Hillcroft Partners, No.
8520090 (Conn. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities Feb. 28, 1986)
the landlord's policy prohibited more than four persons to reside in a three bedroom
apartment. See Restrictive Occupancy Standards, supra note 215, at 153. Under
the local occupancy law, however, a three bedroom apartment was suitable for
eight occupants. See id.
The statistics that the plaintiffs introduced to prove disparate impact were: (1)
a comparison of the families with children in the apartment complex (13%) with
the percentage of families in the area (43%); (2) a comparison of adults-only
households which would be eligible for the apartment (99%) with households with
children, where only 75% would be eligible; and finally (3) 97% of all five person
households contained children. See id. Relying on these statistics, the hearing officer
held that plaintiffs proved a prima facie case of disparate impact. See id.; see also
Smith v. Ring Bros. Management Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 649, 228 Cal. Rptr.
525 (1986). In Smith a couple with two children were refused occupancy to a two
bedroom apartment. See 228 Cal. Rptr. at 525. If the couple had waited to have
their second child until after they had moved in, they would have been permitted
to stay in the apartment. See id. The landlord's standard was more restrictive than
the local occupancy code. See 228 Cal. Rptr. at 525 n. 1. The court found that although
the practice was "age neutral," the landlord's refusal was in violation of a Los Angeles
Municipal Code because it "favors children in utero, or in contemplation, over children
in esse." 228 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26.
242. See infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies
that presently are and those that should be made available in these cases.
243. See infra notes 265-82 and accompanying text for the current evidentiary
rules and those that are needed to lessen plaintiffs' burden of proof.
244. See supra note 211-12 for a list of criminal offense statutes.
245. See supra note 219 for a list of statutes which provide for a private cause
of action.
246. See Granelli, supra note 239, at 20, col. 2.
247. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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afford a private attorney. 248 Therefore, a commission would be
helpful in enforcing the rights of these individuals.
The advantages of a commission would include: (1) public in-
vestigations of discrimination by the commission's use of checkers-
commission personnel posing as potential tenants;2 49 (2) a central
location for both the investigation and resolution of complaints; 2 0
and (3) a forum capable of handling cases quickly25' and inexpen-
sively, made possible by conciliation efforts and commission hear-
ing. 25 2 For the commission to be effective, states must enact statutes
that unequivocally prohibit discrimination against families in all
housing 2"1 and give the commission jurisdiction to hear complaints. 5 4
If a statute provides both for a private cause of action and a
housing commission, a conflict in jurisdiction could arise between
248. In 1977, 41.8% of female-headed households with children and three-fifths
of all black families headed by women were at the poverty level. See Golubock, supra
note 10, at 130 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING OUR
FAMrms 3 (1980)).
249. See Calmore, supra note 141, at 629.
250. Telephone interview with Joan Thompson, Director of the Fair Housing Divi-
sion, New York City Commission on Human Rights (Aug. 2, 1986).
251. It is questionable how quickly a complaint is resolved by a housing coin-
mission. For instance, in People v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp., 129 Il.
App. 3d 584, 472 N.E.2d 547 (1984) (Race Track If), the complaint was at the
hearing stage for two years.
252. See S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6153 (1983); see also
S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 850 (1986).
253. It is necessary to limit the exemptions to two-family owner-occupied resi-
dences because of the lack of housing available for family living. See Protests Are
Mounting, supra note 203, at 58, col. 3 ("Pat Harris, Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion & Welfare, has called the shortage of apartments that allow children a top con-
cern of the agency's new Office of Families"). See supra note 216 for the percen-
tages of apartments made available for families. Furthermore, if it did not apply
to all housing, landlords would probably convert their buildings into condominiums.
See Protests Are Mounting, supra note 203, at 58, col. 3 ("[vlacancy rates in many
cities are at a record low because of the sharp decline in building and the conversion
of many rental projects to condominiums"). Finally, if a statute does not explicitly
prohibit discrimination in co-operatives, condominiums, etc., it is unlikely that a
court would apply the statute to situations other than rentals. See Pardy v. Foun-
tainhead Owners Corp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 14, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Westchester County). A bill currently pending in the New York State Senate would
amend the New York statute by including cooperatives and condominiums in the
statute's coverage. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
254. The necessity for the legislature to give a housing commission the jurisdiction
to hear these complaints is exemplified by what transpired in California after the
decision of Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). After Marina Point, the De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing refused to accept the child discrimination
complaints because it questioned its jurisdiction unless the complaint also alleged
discrimination on the basis of "sex, religion [or] race." See Davis, supra note 238,
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the commission's tribunal and a court.2 5 In an effort to resolve this
conflict, some statutes stipulate that once a complaint is filed with
the commission, a party waives its right to a private cause of action
unless, as in some of the statutes, the party dismisses the complaint
filed with the commission. 56 Some courts also require an exhaustion
of administrative remedies before asserting jurisdiction over the mat-
ter.
25 7
To date, only one case has been brought to the attention of a state
court in which the statute had granted enforcement authority to a
commission. People v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp.258 illustrates
the procedural absurdities that can occur when a court attempts to
assert its jurisdiction over a housing complaint. In this case, the statute
specified that the court's jurisdiction was limited to granting temporary
relief during the pendency of the commission's proceedings or reviewing
an order of the commission. 59 The case also exemplifies the ineffi-
ciency that can occur in a commission's enforcement of the statute. 6 'Accordingly, statutes must be drafted explicitly to give plaintiffs
the right to bring a private cause of action, so that a court can
assert its jurisdiction without requiring an exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies.2 61 Furthermore, the statutes should provide a "bail-
at 4, col. 4. Two years after the Marina Point decision, the Fair Employment and
Housing Commission voted that the department had the jurisdiction and the de-
partment finally agreed to accept the complaints. See id.; see also Carrizosa, Housing
Agency Reverses Stance on Families With Kids, L.A. Daily L.J., Dec. 11, 1984,
at 2, col. 4 ("the department had been refusing to accept the complaints, first for
lack of money, then for lack of legal authority").
255. See, e.g., People v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp., 129 Ill. App. 3d
584, 472 N.E.2d 547 (1984) (Race Track 1).
256. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-98a (West Supp. 1986) (in lieu of but
not in addition to, filing complaint); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2556 (1981) (cause of
action for damages unless complaint filed with agency; however, can bring separate
cause of action if complainant dismisses agency complaint before final disposition);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 9 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (aggrieved party can bring
separate cause of action within ninety days of filing complaint with commission
if dismisses complaint pending before commission).
257. See, e.g., East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 448, 305 N.E.2d 507, 510 (1973).
258. 129 11. App. 3d 584, 472 N.E.2d 547 (1984) (Race Track 11).
259. See 122 I11. App. 3d at 521, 461 N.E.2d at 508 (1984) (Race Track 1).
260. The original complaint was filed with the housing department on May 6,
1982. See Race Track I, 122 I1l. App. 3d at 519, 461 N.E.2d at 507. On December
7, 1984, the date of the decision in Race Track H, however, the department had
still not rendered a decision.
261. See, e.g., The Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982) (no
exhaustion of administrative remedies required).
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out" provision, which gives a party the option to drop commission
proceedings and bring a private cause of action, without waiving
this right once the proceedings begin.262
The establishment of a commission is necessary to resolve this
problem, because many of the persons affected by discriminatory
practices would be unable to hire private attorneys.23 In view of
the lack of effective enforcement by attorneys general and the value
of a commission as an agency to hear complaints, New York and
Missouri have proposed bills to have families protected as a class
under the Human Rights Laws.2 4 The commission would investigate
complaints and inform injured parties that they could pursue a
private cause of action or seek redress through the commission.
3. Evidentiary Problems
When a complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation, a commission
262. A bail-out provision is necessary because many of the statutes waive a
party's right to a private cause of action once department proceedings begin. See
supra note 256 for a list of the statutes that require a plaintiff to waive his
rights to a private cause of action once commission proceedings begin. Furthermore,
courts usually require an exhaustion of administrative remedies if an administrative
body is empowered to deal with the complaints. See, e.g., East Chop Tennis Club
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 305 N.E.2d 507
(1973).
263. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
264. See Lublin, supra note 7, at 35, col. 4; see also N.Y.S. 6046-A, N.Y.A.
6824, 208th Sess. (1985); Nix, Panel Acts on Rent Bias Against Children in City,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1986, at BI, col. 5 [hereinafter Nix].
The state's Real Property Law prohibits discrimination against children
in housing, but it has rarely been used in such cases because its enforceable
only by the Attorney General or through a state court and there is a
maximum fine of $100 .... The proposed bill would allow victims to
win compensatory damages of as much as $25,000 through the Human
Rights Commission.
Nix, supra, at B17, col. 5.
New York City recently passed a law that amends the administative code of the
City of New York by protecting children along with the other classes from dis-
crimination in all housing (rental units, co-operatives, etc.), and exempts only two-
family owner-occupied rooming houses and dormitories. See New York, N.Y.,
1986 N.Y. Local Laws 1 (No. 17).
Similar bills that would have amended section 296(5) of New York's Executive
Law were introduced in 1983 and 1984 and passed in the Assembly (A. 694, A. 694-
D). See Memorandum of Attorney General Robert Abrams, N.Y.S. 6046-A, N.Y.A.
6824, 208th Sess. 1-2 (May 8, 1985). The bill was introduced because:
The Attorney General believe[d] that the acute housing shortage in many
parts of the State warrant[ed] the expansion of the housing discrimination
laws to ensure that all New Yorkers have an equal opportunity-free
from the obstacles posed by arbitrary barriers to seek a variety of housing
accommodations. The bill recognize[d] the need of individuals and families
19871
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hearing usually begins. 265 Thus, evidentiary burdens are involved in
both commission proceedings and private litigations . 66 Because of
the difficulty in proving an act of discrimination, the statutes should
specify both the burdens of production and persuasion 267 and on
whom these burdens should be placed.
In a Fair Housing Act cause of action, to make a prima facie
case, the complainant must show that: (1) he is a member of a
protected class under the Act; (2) he qualifies for the requested
apartment; (3) the landlord rejected his application; and (4) the
apartment remained unoccupied after the landlord's rejection.26 s In
other words, the Fair Housing Act imposes a four-part burden of
production upon the plaintiff. After this initial showing, the courts also
place the burden of persuasion on the complainant. 269 At both stages
of the litigation, the evidentiary burdens weigh heavily on the plain-
tiff.
The same rules would be applicable to a child discrimination case,
and thus the burden of persuasion would be on the plaintiff.270 Once
the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, a landlord, in order
to avoid a directed verdict or summary judgment, must explain his
to rent an apartment or space in a mobile home park, or to buy a
cooperative or condominium on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Id.
265. See S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. 855 (1986).
266. See infra notes 268-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
evidentiary burdens.
267. For the purposes of this Note, the burden of production will encompass
the evidence plaintiff must bring forth in order to make out a prima facie case.
The burden of persuasion will be used synonymously with the burden of proof,
and will encompass the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
an act of discrimination did or did not occur.
268. See Fundamental Issues, supra note 166, at 581 (citing Robinson v. 12 Lofts
Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (court used this four-part prima
facie case)). Other courts have applied this formula to housing discrimination cases.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails CommuMty Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 189-90 (7th
Cir. 1982) (court uses this four-part prima facie case); Smith v. Anchor Bldg.
Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976) ("where a black rental applicant meets
the objective requirements of a landlord, and the rental would likely have been
consummated were he or she a white applicant, a prima facie inference of dis-
crimination arises as a matter of law"); see also Calmore, supra note 141, at 625-
26.
This four-part prima facie showing is the norm for suits brought under the Fair
Housing Act by a single plaintiff. See Calmore, supra note 141, at 626. When a
broad class-based discrimination is alleged, however, the prima facie showing would
most likely be the discriminatory effects showing. See supra note 169 and accom-
panying text.
269. See C. TILFORD, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (1984) (hereinafter
MCCORMICK]. Thus, "[iun most cases, the party who has the burden of pleading
a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence and of persuading the jury of
its existence as well." Id. at 948 (citations omitted).
270. See id.
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rejection of a prospective tenant, decision for eviction, or denial of
a lease renewal with any non-discriminatory reason.271 The burden
of persuasion would then shift back to the plaintiff, who must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant discriminated
against him because of his children and that the defendant's reasons
were pretextual.272
In an effort to remedy the problem, the District of Columbia has
created a rebuttable presumption of discrimination in its statute,
when the person alleging discrimination has one or more children. 273
An adoption of a rebuttable presumption in these statutes would
lessen the plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case. Thus
this Note advocates adopting a rebuttable presumption. At present,
a division of authority exists on the effect of a rebuttable presump-
271. See Fundamental Issues, supra note 166, at 581 ("[ilf the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to 'articulate some
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiff's] rejection' ") (citing McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); see also Williams v. Colorado
Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981). If, however, it
is a broad, class-based action, the defendant may have to show a compelling business
necessity in order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
In a broad class-based action, once a plaintiff proved that the policy had a
disproportionate impact on families, or that the landlord intended to discriminate
because of the presence of children, the landlord would have to justify his actions.
When the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of discriminatory intent, the defendant
could assert any " 'legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged prac-
tice.' " Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 (citation omitted). However, it is not clear how
important the justification must be in order to prevent being found liable when
plaintiffs assert a discriminatory impact prima facie case. See Restrictive Occupancy
Standards, supra note 215, at 153. In Betsey, the landlord had to justify his action
by showing a compelling business necessity. See Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988. However, in
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Hillcroft Partners, the court
adopted the test pronounced in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Whitman Area Improvement Council v. Resident
Advisory Bd., 435 U.S. 908 (1978), which states that "a justification must serve,
in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant,
and the defendant must show that no alternative course of action could be adopted
that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory impact." Rizzo,
564 F.2d at 149; see Restrictive Occupancy Standards, supra note 215, at 153.
272. See infra note 275. It is important to note, however, that when the statute
makes the discrimination a criminal offense, the burden of proof could'be "beyond
any reasonable doubt." See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
273. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515(c)(2) (1981) which provides:
(2) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that an unlawful discriminatory
practice has occurred if the person alleging discrimination has I or more
children who reside with that person and any of the acts prohibited by
subsections (a) & (b) of this section are done to maintain residential
occupancies more restrictive than the following: (A) In an efficiency
apartment, 2 persons; or (B) In an apartment with 1 or more bedrooms,
2 times the number of bedrooms plus 1.
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tion. Under the first view, the rebuttable presumption shifts the
burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed fact-
i.e., the fact of discrimination in the refusal to rent because of the
presence of children-to the defendant, who must then assert proof
of the non-existence of discrimination.27 4 Under the second view,
the presumption can shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant,
who must then convince a judge or jury, by a preponderance of
the evidence, 275 that he did not engage in discrimination. 2 6 The first
view is called the Thayer Theory, 277 which the Model Code of
Evidence has adopted and the Federal Rules of Evidence have in-
corporated in Federal Rule of Evidence 301 .278 The latter view is
referred to as the Morgan View, 279 and states "that anything worthy
of the name 'presumption' has the effect of fixing the burden of
persuasion on the party contesting the existence of the presumed
fact. "2 0
California adopted an interesting approach to determine which
view should be utilized in a trial. Sections 605 and 606 of California's
Evidence Code provide that presumptions established to implement
some public policy shift the burden of proof.2 1 Sections 603 and
604 provide that a presumption that does not implement public
policy other than to facilitate the determination of a particular action,
shifts the burden of producing evidence.2 12 In other words, if public
policy concerns are involved in the enforcement of a statute, Cal-
ifornia's statute would shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant
to show that he did not engage in a discriminatory act. This Note
agrees with the California system, and recommends that the statutes
explicitly shift the burden of persuasion in child discrimination cases
to defendants once a rebuttable presumption is established. When a
state enacts a statute that bans child discrimination, public policy con-
cerns outweigh the courts' reluctance to interfere with the use and
enjoyment of a landlord's property.2"3
274. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
275. See MCCORMICK, supra note 269, § 339, at 956; id. § 340, at 959. It appears
that "preponderance of the evidence" is the standard of proof typically used in
civil cases. See id. However, when there is a claim which is disfavored by the
courts, (e.g., fraud, oral contracts to make a will, modifications of written agree-
ments) courts may require a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See id.
276. See id.
277. See MCCORMICK, supra note 269, § 344, at 974-75.
278. See id. at 975.
279. See id. at 980-81.
280. See id. at 980.
281. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 605, 606 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987).
282. CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 603, 604 (West 1966).




Finally, the greatest weakness in the present statutes is the lack
of financial incentives to bring a private cause of action. 214 A private
individual is more likely to be diligent in pursuing his rights than
a commission would be-acting on his behalf. 285 Although most statutes
provide for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party,216
such an award is far from guaranteed. 2 7 Thus, a plaintiff is likely
.... " Premium Point Park Ass'n v. Polar Bar, 306 N.Y. 507, 512, 119 N.E.2d
360, 362 (1954).
284. See infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies
available.
285. See supra note 260 for an example of how long a case may take before
it is resolved by a commission.
286. See Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(c)(4) (Supp. 1986) (court costs and
reasonable attorney's fees); CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987)(attorney's fees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-86(c) (1986) (attorney's fees); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2553(a)(l)(E) (1981) (reasonable attorney's fees); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 8, para. 108(G) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) ("pay to the complainant all or a
portion of the costs of maintaining the action, including reasonable attorney fees
and expert witness fees"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4614, 4622 (Supp. 1986)
(no award of attorney's fees or civil penalty unless commission dismissed the
complaint or failed within 90 days to enter a conciliation agreement); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 504.255 (West Supp. 1987) (treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees
for unlawful ouster or exclusion); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236(b)(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1987) ("reasonable attorney's fees . . . may be awarded to a prevailing
plaintiff"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-5(L) (1)(B) (1984) (costs and reasonable at-
torney's fees); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-94(b) (1984) (court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees). If the statute does not expressly provide for attorney's fees, a
court may, nevertheless, imply such an award from the statutory intent. See, e.g., E.D.
Swett, Inc. v. New Hampshire Comm'n for Human Rights, 124 N.H. 404, 470
A.2d 921 (1983) (although statute did not authorize award of attorney's fees, court
found it to be appropriate to award them because of legislative purpose of statute).
But see MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986) (explicitly
forbidding award of attorney's fees).
287. See, e.g., Powell, The Effects of Hensley v. Eckerhart on the Award of
Attorney's Fees, 13 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (1985) [hereinafter Attorney's Fees].
For instance, under the Fair Housing Act, a court may grant attorney's fees to
the prevailing plaintiff if in the court's opinion the plaintiff is not financially able
to pay the fees. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)
(1982). The Second and Ninth Circuits deny attorney's fees "in cases in which the
prospects of success are sufficiently high to attract competent private counsel without
the incentive provided by CRAFAA." Attorney's Fees, supra, at 540-41.
Even if a court is willing to award attorney's fees, the court will require that
the fees are "reasonable." See Attorney's Fees, supra, note 534-35. Federal courts
evaluate reasonableness by weighing several factors:
(1) [Tjime and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)
customary fee in the community; (6) whether fee was fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitation imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) amount
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to receive at most only an award of compensatory damages2" and
possibly the satisfaction of seeing a civil penalty imposed on the defen-
dant.2"9
A plaintiff's compensatory damage award could include such out-
of-pocket costs as: (1) loss of income;290 (2) moving and storing
expenses;2 91 (3) reasonable expenditures to find adequate and suitable
substitute housing; 292 and (4) the difference in the rent charged in
involved and the results attained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys; (10) "undesirability" of the case; (11) nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases within or without the circuit.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974)).
See generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651; Note, Civil Rights-Attorneys' Fees-When
Lodestar Adjusting Factors are Considered in Initial Lodestar Computation, No
Abuse of Discretion for District Court to Reject Further Adjustments Based Upon
Same Factors, 53 Miss. L.J. 679 (1983); Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in Federal
Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 277 (1982); Note, Theories of Recovering Attorney's
Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV 566 (1979).
288. See infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
compensatory damages awarded in these cases.
289. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(c)(3) (Supp. 1986) (plaintiff may re-
cover civil penalty of three times monthly rent if violation was intentional);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(B)(7) (Supp. 1986) (civil penalty damages
$500 for first offense, $1000 for second offense, and $2000 for third offense); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-102 (West Supp. 1986) (civil penalty $200 for first offense,
$500 for subsequent offenses); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-5(L)(1)(c) (1984) (punitive
damages up to $500); see S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 6155,
6158 (1986) (law judge may order equitable and declaratory relief, compensatory
damages and impose civil penalty up to $10,000); see also S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 855, 855 (1986) (in civil action court can award civil penalty
up to $50,000 for first offense and $100,000 for subsequent offenses).
290. See State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 158 W.V. 495, 503, 212 S.E.2d
77, 81 (W. Va. 1975) (no proof that complainant suffered monetary loss, thus,
award based on his earnings was incorrect since he lost no work by reason of
discrimination); Mendota Apts. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights,
315 A.2d 832, 836 (D.C. 1974) (only evidence of pecuniary loss was time out from
work and bus fare); Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli,
357 Mass. 112, 115, 256 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1970) (commission awarded complainant
cost of commuting and loss of time).
One study revealed that 14.3% of the respondents to the survey had job-related
difficulties that were directly caused by discrimination against children in housing.
See Green & Blake, supra note 4, at 24. Fifteen of the 79 complaints concerned
the loss of a job or a job opportunity. See id.
291. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986)
(expenses for alternate housing, storage and moving costs); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-86(c) (1986) (expense for obtaining alternate housing, storage of goods
and effects, moving costs, etc.).
292. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503(c) (1975) (reasonable expenditures to
find adequate substitute housing).
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the substitute apartment. 293 This small award would not encourage
individuals to bring an action on their own behalf, especially when
the greatest damage involves the stress and inconvenience associated
with a denial of adequate shelter. 294 Mental anguish awards are
disfavored in many jurisdictions and usually require extensive evi-
dence as well as medical testimony. 295 Therefore, a solution to this
293. See Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969) (traveling
expenses and additional rent costs); State Div. of Human Rights v. Janica, 37
A.D.2d 444, 447, 326 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (4th Dep't 1971) (increased rent at another
location).
294. Examples of the suffering include:
A Cincinnatti mother, forced to leave her apartment, had to seek a foster
home for her 10-year-old son. A Santa Monica, Calif., family unable
to find housing after a year-long search, set up housekeeping in their
car for several weeks. A divorced woman in Palo Alto, Calif., had to
transfer custody of two of her three children to her former husband
after failing to find a suitable apartment. Experts point to the psychological
strains on parents who are turned away repeatedly by landlords. "Rejec-
tion results in loss of esteem and self-confidence" . . . such parents can
create a "poisoning climate for children."
Protests are Mounting, supra note 203, at 58, cols. 2-3.
295. See generally Trenkner, Recovery Of Damages For Emotional Distress Re-
sulting From Discrimination Because Of Sex Or Marital Status, 61 A.L.R.3d 944
(1975) [hereinafter Damages For Emotional Distress].
The author had found only one case in which a person had recovered against
a real estate agent on the basis of the real estate agent's refusal to rent her an
apartment because of her sex and marital status. See id. at 946-47 (citing Zahorian
v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973)). The author
stated that the court had found that in enacting the statute and giving this type
of damage award, the legislature intended to "serve towards eradication of the
cancer of discrimination and whose remedial actions would serve not only the
interest of the individual involved but also the public interest." Id. at 947.
When conduct is "outrageous," however, a showing of physical distress is
unnecessary. Id. at 945 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d
(1965)).
If, however, discrimination was inflicted intentionally and unreasonably, a person
can recover for emotional distress when it cumulates into foreseeable physical harm.
See id. at 945-46 (citing Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d
216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970)); see also 121-129 Broadway Realty, Inc. v. New York
State Div. of Human Rights, 49 A.D.2d 422, 376 N.Y.S.2d 17 (3d Dep't 1975).
In Broadway, plaintiff's testimony that she became ill and unable to do housework
was enough to support damages of emotional distress without corroborating medical
testimony. See id. at 423-24, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 19; see also Massachusetts Comm'n
Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 115-16, 256 N.E.2d 311, 313
(1970) (court upheld commission's award of $250 for mental suffering because of
racial discrimination in housing). But see Mendota Apts. v. District of Columbia
Comm'n on Human Rights, 315 A.2d 832, 836-37 (D.C. 1974) (lack of evidence
to sustain $950 award for mental anguish and humiliation because doctor who
testified had never examined plaintiff); State Div. of Human Rights v. Janica, 37
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problem would be an award of a civil penalty,296 or treble damages, 297
to compensate for this humiliation and to deter this discrimination.
B. The Constitutionality of Statutes Banning Child
Discrimination
In adopting a statute banning these practices, the balance between
the rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants should result in
favoring the welfare of families at the expense of a landlord's freedom
to contract. The Supreme Court views the regulation of landlord-
tenant relationships to be a legislative rather than a judicial func-
tion.298 As in zoning, statutes creating the rights and liabilities of
landlords and tenants have been upheld as within the police power
of the state as long as they were rationally related to the proper
goal of protecting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of the community. 29 Therefore, statutes banning child discrimination
would be upheld since they promote the general welfare of families.
A.D.2d 444, 447, 326 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (4th Dep't 1971) (insufficient evidence
to support mental anguish award).
296. See supra note 289 and accompanying text for statutes that award a civil
penalty.
297. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987) (liable for actual
damages and up to three times amount of actual damage); MiNq. STAT. ANN.
§ 504-255 (West Supp. 1987) (treble damages).
298. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
299. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1973) ("[llandlord-tenant
law is traditionally the province of the states. State judges are bound as we are
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment"). See also San Jose
Country Club Apts. v. County of Santa Clara, 137 Cal. App. 3d 948, 955, 187
Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (1982) (Unruh Civil Rights Act which protects families from
discrimination in housing upheld against contract clause challenge as "a 'reasonable'
regulation adopted in the interests of the community' ") (citations omitted). But
see Metropolitan Dade County Fair Hous. and Employment Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise
Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 485 So. 2d 865, 867-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (court denied- review of circuit court's holding which declared ordinance
prohibiting age discrimination in housing unconstitutional).
The plurality in Sunrise Village, held that the circuit court "afforded petitioner
a full appeal in compliance with due process requirements, and that it observed
essential legal principles in rendering its decision," Sunrise Village, 485 So. 2d at
867, and therefore, the court of appeals denied discretionary review. See id. The
court agreed in dicta with the circuit court's holding that the law was unconstitutional,
and stated:
The ordinance in question states that its goal is to assure equal opportunity
to all persons to live in decent housing facilities .... Although the
commission, in promulgating the ordinance, adopts a laudatory policy,
it utilizes extreme methods to implement its goal. The effect of the
ordinance is to eliminate all adult and retirement housing in its jurisdiction,




A fourteenth amendment challenge to a landlord's child-exclusion
practice is unlikely to succeed. Even if a court were to find that
the right of families to live together in an apartment was a fun-
damental right, an initial refusal by a landlord would not constitute
state action, except in the unusual case in which the state was a
joint participant with the landlord. A proposed amendment to the
Fair Housing Act would provide an excellent vehicle for the resolution
of this problem and serve as a declaration that this problem is one
of national concern. Without the passage of this amendment, states
must pass their own legislation prohibiting child discrimination. The
statutes enacted by state legislators must give the injured party the
option of an administrative proceeding or a private cause of action.
The more legally sound and persuasive argument is found in Chief Judge Schwartz'
dissent. The Chief Judge stated:
The ordinance in question is firmly rooted in the most fundamental
source of governmental authority: the police power. That doctrine val-
idates any enactment which may reasonably be construed as expedient
for the protection or encouragement of the public health, safety, welfare
or morals .... Anti-discrimination laws like this-which prohibit the
arbitrary exclusion of a class of citizens from otherwise publicly available
facilities and services-are clearly related to the most basic concerns of
the public welfare and morality and thus may not be struck down ....
Indeed, I think it self-evident that government may properly conclude
that it is simply wrong to discriminate on the basis of a personal
characteristic over which the concerned individual has no control-whether
it be race, sex, handicap or age; therefore, there can be no basis for
interfering with a legislative conclusion to forbid it.
Id. at 869 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
In San Jose, a landlord attempted to have the statute declared unconstitutional
because it violated his "rights of association, expression, privacy, travel, speech,
due process, and equal protection." 137 Cal. App. 3d at 954, 187 Cal. Rptr. at
495. The court rejected all of his arguments and upheld the statute as rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. See id. at 955, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
The court rejected the plaintiff's first amendment claim because it held that the
plaintiff had "no [f]irst [a]mendment interest when the 'commercial activity itself
[was] illegal.' " Id. (citing Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Welton v. City of Los Angeles, 18 Cal. 3d 497, 556 P.2d 1119, 134 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1976) and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,
389 (1973)). In addressing the due process denial, the court held that the statute
was neither overbroad, nor unconstitutionally vague. See id. (citations omitted).
Moreover, despite the plaintiff's argument that the exemption of adults-only mobile
home parks violated the equal protection clause, the court held that the statute
passed the rational relationship test because no fundamental right was involved.
See id. (citation omitted).
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They should also provide for evidentiary rules and remedies in order
to serve as a realistic deterrent to child discrimination in housing.
Gretchen Walsh
